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Consumer Products in New Brunswick—
Fidem Habeat Emptor Part II: The C.P.W.L.A. 
Consumer Remedial Regime
IVAN F. IVANKOVICH*
New Brunswick's Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act incor­
porates a comprehensive legislative scheme to deal with consumer pur­
chasing. It attempts to give eff ect to the reasonable expectations of today's 
buyers and suppliers of consumer products. In this article, the author 
provides a detailed commentary on the scope and application of the 
C.P.W .L.A. remedial regime. The N.B. legislation is compared to gen­
eral sales law and enactments in other jurisdictions, with an important 
emphasis on the resolution of potential difficulties.
La Loi sur la responsabilité et les garanties relatives aux produits de 
consommation du Nouveau-Brunswick englobe un plan législatif détaillé 
ayant affaire au pouvoir d'achat du consommateur. Cette Loi a pour 
leut de donner effet aux espérances raisonnables des acheteurs et des 
fournisseurs de biens de consommation d'aujourd'hui. Dans cette étude, 
l'auteur fournit un commentaire détaillé de la portee et de l'application 
du régime de redressement de la L.R.G.R.P.C. La législation du Nou­
veauBrunswick est comparée à la documentation sur la loi des ventes 
ainsi qu'aux promulgations des autres jurisdictions, avec une certaine 
importance accordée à la résolution des problèmes potentiels.
INTRODUCTION
In Part I of this a r tic le1 th e  new C.P.W .L.A. exp ress an d  im plied  w ar­
ran ties w ere d iscussed in detail. I 'he  analysis ev idenced  an u n d erly in g  
p rincip le  w hich p e rm ea ted  the  e x p a n d e d  responsibilities of sellers and  
supp liers  in connection  with what is said an d  w ritten  alxrnt th e ir  p ro d u c ts  
and  th e  reasonab le  p e rfo rm a n c e  ex pecta tions g en e ra ted  in re la tion  to q u a l­
ity, fitness an d  durab ility . It was suggested  that this p rinc ip le  was, p erh ap s, 
l>est c a p tu re d  in the  L atin  ex p ression  (idem habeat emptor— let the  b uyer have 
confidence. T h e  C.P.W .L.A. co n su m er rem edia l reg im e reflects th e  co n tin ­
ued app lica tion  of the  fidem habeat emptor p rincip le . C o n cu rren tly  reflected  
is an equally pervasive p rincip le  best exp ressed  in a n o th e r  Latin expression : 
Emptores venditores que ultra modum ne disidant— let n e ith e r  buyer n o r seller 
Ik* undu lv  p re ju d iced . T h u s , while th e  C.P.W.L.A. significantly ex p an d s
*B A ((am suis). St B A (Wisconsin). I I B ( I N  B ) Associate Professor. Department ol Industiial ami 
L e g a l  Relations. Kacults of Business. I imersitv of Alhetta
'Ivankovuh. "Consuinei Products in New B im isw uk—h tlrm  U nheal h mfjhn 1’ait I I In-( PAS 1 S Its 
Scope and Warranties.” (1983) 32 I \  H I /  123 llerem aftei this a itu le  will Ik- referred to as Part I
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th e  co n su m e r’s rig h t o f  re jection , th is ex pansion  is co u n te rb a lan ced  to 
p rev en t u n d u e  p re ju d ice  to  th e  seller by ad o p tio n  o f  a sixty day  rejection  
lim itation  p erio d , th e  seller’s rig h t to  d e d u c t fo r use an d  d e tio ra tio n  and  
to  rectify  b reaches o f  w arran ty . T h ese  righ ts a re  co u n te rb a lan ced  to  p rev en t 
u n d u e  p re ju d ice  to th e  co n su m er. T h u s , th e  sixty day rejection  lim itation 
perio d  is inapplicab le  to “m a jo r” b reaches o f  w arran ty . T h e  rig h t to  d ed u c t 
fo r use an d  d e tio ra tio n  is co u n te rp o ised  by the  b u y e r’s lien to  recover 
paym ents, an d  th e  rig h t to  rectify is subject to  excep tions based bo th  on 
p o ten tia l p re ju d ice  to  the  b u y er an d  th e  b u y e r’s o v e rrid in g  righ t to  reject 
in the  event o f  non-rectification . It is precisely because o f  the  pervasive 
influence o f  th e  Emptores venditores que ultra modum ne disidant p rinc ip le  in 
this a rea  o f  th e  C.P.W .L.A. tha t both  buyers an d  sellers can have confidence 
in the  new co n su m er rem ed ia l reg im e. T h is  legislative con junc tion  of fulem 
habeat emptor a n d  fidem habeat venditor is especially im p o rtan t w hen viewed 
in the  con tex t o f  the  seller’s lim ited o p p o rtu n ity  u n d e r  the  C.P.W .L.A. to 
exclude o r  restric t C.P.W .L.A. reu n ifie s .
T h e  p u rp o se  o f  this artic le  is to  p rov ide  a de ta iled  co m m en tary  on  the  
scope an d  application  of th e  C.P.W .L.A. co n su m er rem ed ia l regim e. T h e  
sam e fo rm at established in Part I shall be follow ed, viz. (1) to  discuss the  
new C.P.W .L.A. rem edial concep ts against th e  back g ro u n d  of th e  genera l 
sales law, an d  in com parison  with p reced en t, subsequen t re fo rm  proposals 
an d  en ac tm en ts  in otnc r com m on  law jurisd ictions; (2) to p rov ide  a detailed  
analysis of th e  orig in , p u rp o se  an d  scope o f  an d  the in te rre la tio n sh ip  am ong  
the  various c o n su m er rem ed ia l sections in the  legislation; an d  (3) to com ­
m ent, w here  a p p ro p ria te , on  areas of po ten tia l difficulty  in the  New B ru n s­
wick fo rm u la tio n s with p a rticu la r em phasis  on d eve lopm en ts in o th e r 
ju risd ictions which m ight aid  in th e ir  reso lu tion . A specific discussion of 
the p ro d u c ts  liability aspects of th e  C.P.W  L.A. will be d e fe r re d  and  dealt 
w ith w ithin the  b ro a d e r con tex t o f  C an ad ian  p ro d u c ts  liability law.
I PROBLEMS UNDER THE GENERAL SALES LAW
1. INTRODUCTION
U n d e r th e  Sale of Goods Act'“ the  rem ed ies which mav, in a p p ro p ria te  
c ircum stances, lx* available to  an  agg rieved  buyer are: (I)  rejection  of the  
goods,* (2) dam ages fo r b reach  of w a r ra n ty /  non-delivery  o r delaved  d e ­
livery,4 an d  (3) specific p e rfo rm a n c e  of th e  c o n tra c t/’ W here  the  seller’s 
b reach  of th e  sales co n trac t am o u n ts  to total n o n -p e rfo rm an ce , non-deliv ­
ery by the  seller being  th e  m ost obvious exam ple, th e  b u y e r’s rem ed ies a re  
uncom plica ted . H e mav rescind  th e  sales con tract an d . at his o p tion , recover
u R.S.N B 1973. « S -1 as am Hereinafter the Ac I mav tie referred to as ttic S (. \ 
■Sc» (ions 12(2) and 2H S (. \
'Se< (ion "*<> S (, \
4Sci (ion 4M S (. A 
'Section 49  S (> \
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any paym ents m ade on  accoun t o f  th e  p u rch ase  price  o r  sue fo r dam ages 
which, w h ere  apposite , will inc lude  the  a fo rem en tio n ed  paym ents. In  ex ­
tra o rd in a ry  cases th e  aggrieved  b u y er m ay seek th e  rem edy  o f  specific 
p e rfo rm an ce  if he can establish th a t dam ages a re  no t an  ad eq u a te  remedy* 
an d  th a t th e  goods to  be delivered  a re  specific o r  a sce rta in ed .7
In cases w h tt e tiie se ller’s b reach  o f  th e  sales con trac t does no t am oun t 
to total n o n -p e rfo rm a n ce  th e  b u y e r’s rem ed ia l recou rse  u n d e r  the  Sale of 
Goods Act is fa r  m ore  com plex . In  m ost co n su m er cases th e  buyer's  first 
an d  p rim ary  rem edy  fo r the  se ller’s b reach  o f  con trac t is to  rep u d ia te  the 
con trac t o f  sale an d  reject th e  goods. T h is  rem edy  p erm its  th e  aggrieved  
buyer to set aside a co n trac t with a seller in w hom  he may have lost co n ­
fidence an d  enables him  to p u rch ase  new goods in place o f  def ective goods 
which may need  rep a ir. B ut u n d e r  th e  gen era l sales law a buyer seeking 
this p re fe r re d  rem edy  faces fo rm idab le  p rob lem s in re la tion  to: (1) the 
availability o f  a rig h t to reject in any given case, (2) the  d u ra tio n  o f  the  
rig h t to reject, an d  (3) th e  b u y e r’s righ ts  an d  du ties a fte r  rejection. N or 
a re  p rob lem s p ecu liar to  a b u y er seeking to  reject: a seller seeking to  resist 
rejection faces two equally  d ifficult, if no t in su rm o u n tab le , obstacles: (1) 
th e  b u y er’s rig h t to  reject th e  goods fo r b reach  o f  any cond ition , even if 
the breach  is insignificant, an d  (2) the  seller’s inability in m ost cases to 
“c u te ” his b reach .
B efore o n e  can fully ap p rec ia te  th e  changes, both substantive an d  
p ro ced u ra l, e ffec ted  by the  new C.P.W .L.A. rem edia l reg im e, it is necessary 
to re fe r specifically to these p rob lem s c o n fro n tin g  buyers an d  sellers u n d e r  
the g enera l sales law.
2. BUYER‘S REMEDIAL PROBLEMS
A. AVAILABILITY OF THE BUYER'S RIG H T TO REJECT
U n d e r th e  genera* sales law th e  availability o f  the  b u y er’s righ t to reject 
goods fo r b reach  o f  t ’je se ller’s ob ligations d e p e n d s  prim arily  on  the  c h a r­
ac ter o f  th e  obligation  tha t has been  b reached  an d  not on  the  severity of
'’This is most readily accomplished where a chattel is of partici ‘ *.r im pórtam e and of practically unique 
value to the plaintiff: see Louther v. l.owlhrr (IH(Hj), 13 Ves. 95, 33 h R 230: Rehnke \ Rede Shiftpmg C.o . 
(1927) All E.R Rep bH9 (F .n g K B ) Similarly, where goods are not capable of bring replaced on .in 
“available market" basis: see Simmons C? McRnde Ltd v Kirkpatrick. 11945) 4 D.I..R 134 (B ( S ( |.
'Ceorge tilth  Co l td v (orry. 11951) 1 1)1 R 90 (N.B ( A.) I he term "specific goods is defined in s I 
Y(. A to mean "goods identified and agreed u | m > i i  at the time .i contract of sale- is made I he V i. .4 
contains no definition of the term "ascertained goods" but the phrase has l>een judicially m teipreted .ts 
referring to unascertained g o o d s  which have become more particularly identifiable aflei the contract has 
t>een made: see. for example. Re Western Caruula I’ulpwood Co. l.td , 11930] I 1)1. K 052 at t>">t>, pet Fullerton 
J.A. (Man.C.A ). Until recently it was generally thought that s 49 was the sole source of the buyer s tight 
to an order of sj>ec ihc performance and that the courts were without junsidc tion to grant specihc [km- 
formance of a contract for the sale of goods as vet unidentified see In Re Watt. (1927) I Ch. t»0t> (hng ( A I 
But the recent case of Sk\ Petroleum Ltd v V I  P Petroleum Ltd . (1974) 1 All 1- R 954 (Chan l)iv ), casts 
doubt on this proposition In that c ase ( •oulchng | held that the general resine non imposed bv the' equivalent 
of s 49 S C.A was inapplicable where damages clearlv would not l»e .in adequate remedy
46 U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL  •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B
th e  b reach . A distinctive fe a tu re  o f  th e  Sale of Goods Act is its division o f  
con trac tua l te rm s in to  “co n d itio n s” an d  “w arran tie s”.8 T h e  te rm  cond ition , 
while no t defin ed  by th e  Act, is ex p la ined  by re fe ren ce  to  its legal effect 
in section 12(2):
12(2) Whether a stipulation in a contract of sale is a condition, the breach 
of which may give rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated, or a 
warranty, the breach o f which may give rise to a claim for damages but not 
to a right to reject the gcxxls and treat the contract as repudiated, depends 
in each case on the construction of the contract.
T h e  im p o rta n t d iffe ren ce , th en , betw een cond itions an d  w arran ties is 
th a t b reach  o f  a w arran ty  only en titles the  innocen t party  to  recover d a m ­
ages w hereas b reach  o f  a cond ition , exp ressed  o r im plied , en titles the  in ­
nocent party  to  rescind  th e  co n trac t an d  to  claim  dam ages o r  to  d o  e ith er. 
T h e  question  o f  w hen an  exp ress te rm  o f  th e  con trac t is to be trea ted  u n d e r  
the  g enera l law as a cond ition , an d  th e  d ifficulties in h e re n t in th e  illusive 
test o f  objectively-ascertained in ten tio n  w ere discussed in Part 1." In a d ­
d ition  to  exp ress te rm s, certa in  cond itions may be im plied  in to  a con trac t 
fo r th e  sale o f  goods by th e  Sale of Goods Act. T h u s , fo r exam ple, th e  seller’s 
obligations with respect to  th e  m erch an tab ility "’ an d  fitness" o f  his goods, 
an d  com pliance with th e ir  d e sc rip tio n ,1* a re  all cond itions u n d e r  the  Act 
with th e  result tha t th e  seller's d u ties  in respect th e re o f  m ust be strictly 
com plied  with by th e  seller an d  any b reach  o f  these conditions, how ever 
insignificant, will pnma facie en title  the  buyer to rescission. T h is, as has been 
no ted  on  m any occasions,n  leads to th e  anom alous resu lt th a t a buyer w ho 
com plains o f  a m in o r b reach  o f  a co nd ition , exp ressed  o r im plied , will be 
en titled  to  reject th e  goods a n d  rescind the  con trac t if n o n e  o f  th e  lim itations
" The amhiguitv of the words "condition" and “w .iiran i\" is disc ussed in Stoljat. " 1 he < o iiii.iitn .il ( m u ept 
of Condition". (1953) H9 I. (¿.R 185 "Warranty", for S i, .4 purposes, is defined in s. I( 11 .is "an agreement 
with reference to goods which are the subjeti of a contract of sale, but collateral to the main purpose of 
such contract, the breach of which gives rise to a claim for damages, hut not to a right to reject the goods 
and treat the contract as repudiated " I he qualification introduced l>v the "intermediate term' approac li 
in Cehai'f v Hrrmrr HandfLs^rsrllsi huft m.b.H.. |197b | Q.B 11 (Kng. C.A.), is discussed tnfra at footnote 29
‘‘See Part I. supra, footnote l .a t p p .  144-148. See also Allan. “ I he Scope of the Conti ail." ( I9*>7) II A u*/ 
l .J  274 at p. 275. wherein the author concludes that it is often as easv toi a court to hold that a term was 
a condition as that it was a warranty: ". It mav frequently Im- tempting to conclude that a com ! lias fust 
decided a particular caie simplv upon its merits and then classified the statement involved in a iio id a m c  
with these merits to reac h the- desirable result " I his lac k of preitston was pai tic ularlv clistmlung to Piotessoi 
Williston, the draftsman of the American I tutor m Salrs ,\<i. who concluded that although the classification 
process enabled the courts to "deal fteelv with each case as it arises and to find that words wete intended 
as a condition whenever circumstances make it desirable." the loss of prechc (ability from sue li an appioac li 
was too high a price to pav see Williston. I k /  Law (¡in•rrnirif’ Salr\ of (•<»hI\ at (.nrnmon ¡.an anil multi llu 
I ’mform Art (Rev.ed., 1948) Vol. I. s 183
"'Section 15(b) NY».A
"Section 15(a) .V C. .4
'-Section 14 SC. .4
"See, lol example, h rs t Rrpurt <>/ ifit (onsum n I'tolnlion 1’roffit (onsum n (tuaranlrrs in the S air or S uppl\ "I 
(.iMxis (Department of |ustue. New Hiunswuk. 1974) at pp. 113-1 I I Ileiem .dtei this repot t mav Ik- teferic-d 
to as the h rs t Report See also the Ontario l.aw K clonn Commission s Rrpmt on ( onsmnrt Warranties anil 
Cuaranlfts in the Sale »/ (,mxis (Department of |ustice. I oronto. 1972). hereinafter referied to as the- Ontario 
\\ arrantifs Rrfmrt. at p 3 1. and the O.I..R.C s Report on the Sale of ( ,ihmI\ (Mimstrv of the Allot nev -C•c iic i al. 
I oronto. 1979). heie in .d lei referred to as ttit- Ontario Sale »/ (,mnt\ Report, at pp 149-450
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im posed by th e  Act applies, w hereas th e  buyer who can only establish a 
breach  o f  w arran ty  will be fo rced  to  co n tin u e  with th e  con trac t no tw ith ­
s tand ing  th e  severity o f  th e  breach .
B. DURATION OF BUYER S R IG H T TO REJECT
Even if  the  b u y er is initially en titled  to  reject, he can lose tha t righ t in 
certa in  circum stances p u rsu a n t to  section 12(4) o f  the  Sale of Goods Act:
12(4) Where a contract o f sale is not severable, and the buyer has accepted 
the goods, or part thereof, or where the contract is for specific goods the
f>roperty in which has passed to the buyer, the breach of a condition to be ulhlled by the seller can only be treated as a breach of warranty, and not 
as a ground for rejecting the goods and treating the contract as repudiated, 
unless there is a term of the contract, express or implied, to that effect.
By v irtue o f  this subsection th e  b u y er in an  o rd in a ry  con su m er sale will 
lose his rig h t to  reject in tw o m ajor ways: (1) w here he has accepted  the  
goods, o r  (2) w here  th e  co n trac t was fo r th e  sale o f  specific goods an d  the  
p ro p erty  in these goods has passed to  th e  buyer.
W here th e  b u y er has accep ted  th e  goods, the ra tionale  behind  den y in g  
his righ t to  subsequen tly  reject th em  w ould , at first instance, a p p e a r to  be 
w ell-founded  on  th e  basis th a t he has in fact ag reed  to re ta in  the goods o r, 
at least, has m ade an  election  to  d o  so. T h e  difficulty, how ever, arises from  
the conflict betw een th e  b u y e r’s tig h t, co n fe rred  by section 32(1) of tlie 
Sale oj Goods Act, to  ex am in e  th e  goods wl "n they a re  ten d e re d  o r delivered  
to  him , an d  his “d eem ed  accep tan ce” o f  those goods u n d e r  the  c ircu m ­
stances e n u m e ra te d  in section 33 of th e  Act, viz. (1) w hen he in tim ates to 
the  seller th a t he has accep ted  them , o r  (2) w hen  goods have been delivered  
to him  an d  he does any act in re la tion  to them  which is inconsistent with 
the ow nersh ip  o f  th e  se lle r,1 -u o r  (3) w hen, a f te r  the  lapse o f  a reasonab le  
tim e, he re ta ins the  goods w ithout in tim atin g  to th e  seller that he has 
rejected  them . T h e re  is au th o rity  tha t in th e  even t o f  a conflict betw een 
sections 32 and  33, th e  la tte r section will p rev a il.14 As a result, the  b u y er 
may be placed in an  u n ten ab le  position  with respect to his rejection righ ts 
when he is d eem ed  to  have accep ted  th e  goods even th o u g h  he is unaw are  
tha t the seller is in b reach  a n d  even th o u g h  he has not yet had  a reasonable  
o p p o rtu n ity  to d iscover th a t b reach . The vulnerability  o f  the  buyer who 
indicates his accep tance  o f  th e  goods to th e  seller in an o rd in a ry  co n su m er 
sale was the  subject of p o in ted  co m m en ta ry  in the First Report of the Consumer 
Protection Project’.
. . . [Take] the case where the hu\er has intimated to the seller that he has 
accepted the goods, ft can Ik* argued that the buyer has voluntarily given 
up his rejection rights and there is no cause for concern. But whatever ma\ 
be said as to sales generally, it is submitted that this is an unrealistic argument
IV* For a tull discussion ot die major problems |x»sed by the "iiuonsisteni act" rule, see OnUino Sale of ('¡nods 
Rrpurt. supra. footnote 13, ai pp 469-470.
HHard\ and Company v. H illem \ awl Fowler, | 1923) 2 K B 490 (F.hk C.A.).
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as far as consumer sales are concerned, for the consumer buyer is unlikely 
to appreciate fully the legal consequences of saying that he accepts the goods.
It is one thing if he sees a defect and afterwards still says that he accepts 
the g<x)ds. But it is a different case entirely if he does not know of the defect 
and has not had a reasonable opportunity to discover it. but says he accepts 
the goods because they seem to be in accordance with the contract as far 
as he can tell.1*
Sim ilarly, the  ex igen t restric tion  im posed  by the m ere  lapse o f  tim e on  the 
b u y er’s o p p o rtu n ity  to  exam ine latently-defective goods led th e  O n ta rio  
Law R eform  C om m ission to conclude  th a t . . th e  b u y e r’s righ t to  reject 
is severely c ircum scribed  in tim e, even th o u g h  the  defect is latent an d  
can n o t be ascerta ined  by o rd in a ry  exam ination  o r  testing  an d  does not 
m anifest itself until a considerab le  tim e has e lapsed  a fte r  delivery .’’"’
It is also im p o rtan t to  rem em b er in this con tex t that the  rem edy  o f  
rescission will clearly be lost if restitutio in integrum is im possible, ie. if the 
subject m a tte r o f  th e  co n trac t canno t be re s to re d .17 C o u rts  have, how ever, 
exh ib ited  a w illingness to  m ake som e m onetary  allow ance fo r d e te rio ra tio n , 
thereby  giving effect in p rinc ip le  to  th e  no tion  o f  restitu tion  even th o u g h  
exact restitu tion  in specie canno t be m a d e .1* B ut the  cases d o  not exhib it 
any un ifo rm ity  in this re sp e c t.19
T h e  second way in w hich the  buyer in an o rd in a ry  co n su m er sale will 
lose his righ t to reject occurs w here  the  con trac t is fo r th e  sale o f  specific 
goods an d  the  p ro p e rty  in these goods has passed to  the  buver. T h is  m a n n e r 
o f  losing rejection righ ts m ust be ex am in ed  in con junction  with section 19 
ru le  1 o f  the  Sale of Goods Act which provides in effect th a t p ro p e rty  in 
specific goods will generally pass as soon as the  con trac t is m ade.-’" In 
E ngland  the  Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection m ade  re f­
e ren ce  to  the  absu rd ity  of th e  b u y e r’s position in the o rd in a ry  co n su m er 
sale in the  follow ing term s:
"Supra, footnote 13. ai pp. I I♦"*-1 17
lhfM iarw Sale of Hoods Report, supra, footnote 13. .it p 451. However. rPteni Canadian cases suggest that 
courts will not easily deprive the buver ol Ins light to reject even tl some time has passed since the initial 
delivery of the goods It has lieen held that keeping and using goods lot some time in the hoj>e that thev 
might Ik- repaired by the sellei does not ((institute .«((eptaiue see 1‘olar Refrigeration Servues Ltd \ Mol 
denhauer (1967), til 1) 1 k (2d) 4(>2 (Sask (j  IV); Burroughs Business Machines l td \ heed Rile Mills (1973). 
42 I) L R (3d) 303 (Man ( A t
171n order to entitle a plaintiff to resund one of the law s requirements it must Ik- possible foi ImiiIi panics 
to the contract to Ik* restored to then original |x>sitions: see Thurston v Streilen. 119511 I I) I. K 724 (Man 
K B )
'"See, for example, (.anadian h u m  Implement (.a l.td v Mbrrta houndn  ¿T Mtuhint ( o  Ltd.. \ I9‘J7| 2 I) I K 
H7 I (Alta SC .) and the authorities cited in Fridman. Sale nl (.nods in ( atuuLi. (2nd ed I at p (0 1
'( om paie <l'Haherl\ s \h  Kinlas. | I953| J 1) 1 K M l i\ll< l s (  ). v« licit* the plaiulill was all<>»c<l in 
t cl in n an automobile for full tel urn of hei pun hast* pi it e sonic l< >m tli mouths and seven thousand mil«' 
allct sale, and Osnu ( hiss. Ltd \ W illiams, ( 19 ”*71 I Ml 1 K VJ’i l in g  < \  I. w licic tin dcpici i.ilnin 
occasioned h\ seven months use made it I.it too late toi the buvci to ie|c«i tin i.n
•'"In the u s e  of an unconditional com rail lot the sale ol s|x*i tht goods in a deliverable slate, proprrtv 
passes when the contrail is made sec Kursell v I imhei Opeuitors and ( .ontnutors Ltd . | 1927| I k B 29H 
(Kng. (..A .)
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. .  . the consumer is deprived of his right of rejection at the moment when 
he agrees to buy. If he finds the goods to be defective as soon as he gets 
home he has no right to return them. If the shopkeeper declines to take 
them back the purchaser is entitled in law only to sue him for damages.
What he wants is to get his money back. We regard this position as deeply 
unsatisfactory. With elaborate packaging precluding inspection, and the 
impossibility of testing the operation of appliances in the shop, the consumer 
is often buying in ignorance. The value of the article usually discourages 
resort to Court action and a minority of retailers rest secure in this knowl­
edge.21
B ecause the  dif ficulties in h e re n t in th e  language o f  sections 12(4) and  
33 o f  th e  Sale of Goods Act have no t been  elim inated  by legislative a m e n d ­
m ent in any C an ad ian  p rov ince ,22 it has fallen u p o n  the  cou rts  to  p reserve  
the  b u y er’s righ t to  reject goods in a p p ro p ria te  circum stances d esp ite  the  
literal m ean in g  o f  th e  S.G.A. B ut, while jud ic ia l casuistry  has been  equal 
to  the task ,2'  the  resu ltin g  collection o f  highly technical d istinctions has 
d o n e  little to  e lucidate  fo r th e  aggrieved  b u y er the  precise cricum stances 
u n d e r  which he can avail h im self o f  w hat is o ften  his m ost effective, if  not 
only rem edy .
C. BUYER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES AFTER REJECTION
U n d er the g enera l sales law a buyer exercising  his righ t o f  rejection  
m ust p ro m p tly 24 notify  th e  seller of his refusal to accept the  goods in 
p e rfo rm an ce  u n d e r  the  co n trac t. Section 34 S.G.A. p rovides th a t in these 
c ircum stances the  buyer is no t b o u n d  to re tu rn  rejected  goods to  the  seller:
11 London, H.M.S.O. 1962, C'.mnd 1781, para. 460. Ihe conceptual difficulties were more succinctly ex ­
pressed bv the New Brunswick Consumer Protection Project in its First Report, supra, footnote IS, at p. 114 
as follows: “It is difficult to imagine a restriction on rejection rights that is more ridiculous than this one 
tan he."
»T his has been accomplished m part in the U.K.: see sections 11(1 He) and 35 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1979 
(I K.) which incorporate the am endm ents effected bv s. 4 of the ,Vf̂ representation Act. 1967 (U.K.). These 
amendments eliminate the relevancy of the passing of property to rejection rights and expressly provide 
that deem ed acceptance is subject to the buver having a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods to 
determine their conformity except in those cases where he has indicated to the seller his acceptance of the 
goods For commentary, see: Ativah and Treitel, “Misrepresentation Act, 1967", (1967) 30 Mod. I.. R n \  
369. and Z.iegel, “Reform of the I.aw of Inncxent Misrepresentation". (1962) 27 Sask. L. Rex’. 134.
•’See. for exam ple, the controversial decision m Varley v. Whtpp. 11900) 1 Q.B. 513 (Q.B.). where it was 
held that property in specific goods had not passed to the buver bee ause the contract was not "unconditional" 
within the meaning of New Brunswick's s. 19 rule I. In O'Flaherty v. MckmUiy. supra, footnote 19, it was 
held that the equivalent of New Brunswick's s. 12(4), bv its closing words, does not disentitle a buver to 
rescission where there is an implied tetm  in the contract providing for rescission for breach of a condition. 
A similar result obtained in Polar Refrigeration Sen tees l.td v. MoLlenhauer. supra, footnote 16. In Wofakowski 
v Pembina Dodge Chrysler l td . 11976) 5 W.W.R. 97 (Man Q H ), the court allowed a plaintiff to reject an 
automobile som e time after sale on the basis that only a “conditional” property passed which was not a 
passing of property for purposes of the equivalent to New Brunswick's s. 12(4). T he judicial techniques, 
of whic h the foregoing examples are illustrative, have generated a considerable body of academic analysis: 
see. for example, (iower, "Sale of (>oods— Right of Rejection", (1949) 12 Mod I. Rev 368; Smith. "Ihe  
Right to Rescind for Breach o f  Condition in a Sale of Spec ific (.oods I'nder the Sale of Goods Act. 1893", 
(19511 14 Mod I Rev I 73; Ativah. "Loss of Buver’s Right to Rejec t in Contracts of Sale", (1965) 8 1 L (¿.R 
487.
24Delay, of course, runs the risk of tiiggerm g a "deemed acceptance" under the provisions of s. 33 S.G.A
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34 Unless otherwise agreed, where goods are delivered to the buyer, and 
he refuses to accept them, having the right so to do, he is not bound to 
return them to the seller, but it is sufficient if he intimates to the seller that 
he refuses to accept them.
A fter giving th e  seller no tice o f  re jection , the  b u y er is, how ever, req u ired  
to  place th e  re jec ted  goods at th e  se ller’s d isposal.25 T h e  Act does not 
p rov ide a specific answ er to  th e  question  o f  w h e th e r th e  buyer is perm itted  
to  re tu rn  re jec ted  goods at th e  seller’s ex p en se  o r, alternatively , sto re  them  
at the  se ller’s ex p en se  p e n d in g  recap tion  by th e  seller.2H
A fu r th e r  practical difficulty  c o n fro n ts  th e  b u y er w ho has fully o r 
partially paid  fo r re jec ted  goods. H e does no t possess, e ith e r at com m on 
law o r  by v irtue  o f  th e  S.G.A., any lien on  th e  goods fo r the  repaym en t o f  
the  pu rch ase  price. C onsequen tly , once he has re jec ted  goods, the  buyer 
can be req u ired  to  re linqu ish  them  to  th e  seller an d  re legated  to p u rsu e  
in d ep en d en tly  any claim  he may have fo r m oney paid  o r  d am ages.27
3. SELLER'S PROBLEMS WITH THE BUYER'S REMEDIES
A. RIGIDITY OF THE A PRIORI CLASSIFICATION
W e previously  exam in ed , from  th e  b u y e r’s perspective, th e  difficulties 
occasioned u n d e r  th e  g enera l sales law w here the  buyer's  rem ed ies for 
breach  o f  th e  seller’s obligations a re  m ade to  d e p e n d  prim arily  on  the 
ch a rac te r o f  th e  obligation  that has been  b reached  an d  not on  the  severity 
o f  the  breach . But, because th e  b uyer is initially en titled  to reject for any 
b reach o f  cond ition , th e  seller o ften  finds h im self in a m ost difficult position 
in re la tion  to  th e  techn ica l-m inded  buyer who w ants to  relieve him self o f  
a bargain  th a t he no  lo n g er finds d esirab le .2H It is no t su rp ris in g  then  that 
the  rig id  a priori classification o f  all con trac tu a l te rm s in con trac ts fo r the 
sale o f  goods in to  co n d itions an d  w arran ties was recently  questio n ed  in
n See Hardy and Company v. Htllrms and FowUr. supra. footnote 14, |x r  Bankes L.J. at p. 4(.Hi Cf k u n  Irk  
( J u k i v. British Tradrrs & Shtpprr\ l  td . [1954] 2 Q  B 459 at p. 4HH. per Devline |
• 'B u i sec I H un  Equipm ent R en ta l l t d  v /oirit V rut m e  Iquiprnent S nle\ (1975 ). ‘M> K (2«li 153: • 1) 1 K 
(lid) *>21 (O u t I I .(.;.). v» h e ro  th e  buv e i re  jet te d  ill«' g o o d s  a n d  i e to v e i ed  Ins p u t t  hast- pr ii o in a d d itio n  lo  
d am a g e s  lo t th e  tnonev  s|>ent l»\ h im  hi m ov ing  a n d  s to r in g  th e  g o o d s  p e n d in g  th o u  le ta p t io n  bv the 
sellet It is in te re s tin g  in th is  res|H-< I to  to m p a io  se< lio n s  2-»>(l2 (2)(tl) a n d  2-t><>4 I ( ( th e  lo i m i l ob lig ing  
d ie  b u v e r a f te i  re jec tio n  lo  h o ld  th e  g oods w ith re a so n a h lt « a te  al th e  se lle i's  d isp o s itio n  lo t s iiIIk io iii 
lim e to  |>ei mil th e  sellet to  i t  m ove  th e m , a n d  th e  la tte r  allow ing  th e  b m e t  al th e  sellet s e \ |> e n se  to  s io x  
goods, return them to the sellet oi resell them
VJ.L. Lyons and Cirmpany. l td  v. May anti Baker. l td  . [ I923| I K B  t>M5 (K B .)
**’1 he Ontario 1-avs Kef orni (Commission letem lv reiterated its t ntit ism of suth arbitrary lesults: set -Ontario 
Sale of (toods Report, supra, footnote 13, at p. 14b. Admittedly the temptation for a buver to at ( to his 
ct onomit advantage in a Hut mating market will most often arise in non-tonsum er tases. le where g o o d s  
have been bought for purposes of tesale or where the buver uses the goods hi laige quantities as part ol 
a manufacturing process But. on the other hand, a tonsum er tnav regrei having signed on the dotted line 
betause he has discovered dial he tan make a IxMter deal elsewhere In such (ases. as noted in Note. (1970) 
69 M uh I R n  130 at p 135. "the lukle tonsum er mav reait like'the foiled glue sjietulator and irv lo
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Cehave N.V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H.29 Som e years ea rlie r D iplock 
L.J., in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., called 
a tten tio n  to  th e  im p ro p rie ty  o f  such a classification u n d e r  th e  gen era l law 
o f  con tract:
There are, however, many contractual undertakings of a more complex 
character which cannot be categorized as being "conditions” or “warran­
ties” . . .  Of such undertakings all that can be predicated is that some breaches 
will and others will not give rise to an event which will deprive the party 
not in default of substantially the whole benefit which it was intended that 
he should obtain from the contract; and the legal consequences of a breach 
of such undertaking, unless provided for expressly in the contract, depend 
upon the nature of the event to which the breach gives rise and do not 
follow automatically from the prior classification of the undertaking as a 
“condition” or a “warranty”.*4’
In the  Cehave case th e  English C o u rt o f  A ppeal app lied  th e  Hong Kong Fir 
test to  an  exp ress te rm  in a co n trac t o f  sale no tw ith stan d in g  p rio r  conven­
tional w isdom  which suggested  th a t th e  equ ivalen t o f  New B runsw ick’s 
section 12(2) S.G.,4. req u ire d  exclusive reliance  on  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  term  
broken  an d , th e re fo re , p rec lu d ed  tak ing  in to  accoun t th e  consequences o f  
breach. Even if th e  Cehave case finds u ltim ate  acceptance in C anada , the  
applicability o f  its “in te rm ed ia te  te rm ” ap p ro ach  w ould a p p e a r  to be lim ited 
to u n d esig n a ted  te rm s in a con trac t o f  sale. In  those cases w here  th e  parties 
have expressly  stipu la ted  certa in  term s as cond itions o r  w arran ties,Sl and  
in those cases w here  this has been  d o n e  by th e  leg isla ture ,32 th e  rigidity  o f  
the a pnon  classification w ould still prevail u n d e r  th e  g enera l sales law,35 
and  p rov ide  th e  techn ica l-m inded  buyer with a lawful excuse to re fu se  to 
p e rfo rm  his con trac tu a l obligations. I'hus, fo r exam ple, as in International 
Bnsmess Machines Co. Ltd. v. Shcherban, th e  buyer w ould be en titled  u n d e r  
the  g enera l sales law, even a fte r  Cehave, to  reject a m ach ine because o f  a 
b roken  glass dial costing  only cents to  rep a ir:
^(19761 Q.B 44 (Lng.C.A.). T he concept ot an “intermediate stipulation" adopted bv Lord Denning in 
ih** Cehave c ase was also applied in Tradax International S.A v. ('•oldschmidt S.A., [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 604 
(Eng Q B ). Hunge Corp. v. Tradax b'.sport .V.V. [1980] I Lloyd’s Rep 294 (Eng. C.A.).
'"| I962| 2 Q.B 26 .n p. 70 (hug ( A.I Note that in ibis case the alióse lest was applied lo the terms ol a 
< harteiparls in he ld  s /.ten. | l ‘.M*3| S ( K 632, the Supit im- ( ourt ol ( .anada adopted an analwit al method 
similai lo tli.it em plosed l>\ Diplot k I | In te lereiu e  lo undesignated contractual term in issue |udson
| . willing loi the tou tt. staled al p 63*» In deciding whether the reined\ is rescission, with all us 
( imseuuenc es oi damages, the emphasis should Ih- on the sei lousness ol the delec use performaiHe in the 
patticulai contract Nothing in I lit- was ol clarits is gamed bs attaching a I.iIk-I lo the i lause
’ ‘Whether a term is a condition or a warranty generally turns on the construction o f  the contract and it 
mav lie a condition although designated a warranty : see s. 12(3) S.C.A. and Table Stake Construction Ltd v. 
¡anti (1977). 82 D.L.R. (3d) 113 (( )nt. H.C.). Similarly, it may be a warrants although designated a condition: 
see Wukman Tool Sales Ltd y. L. Schuler A C. . [ 1972) I W.L.R. 840; affirmed 11974] A.C. 235 (H.L.).
,;iAll S C A implied terms a ie  designated as conditions except the seller's implied obligations with respect 
to quiet possession and freedom from encumbrances which are designated as warranties: see s. 13 (b) and
(c).
"Admittedly it would not Ik- inconsistent with the permissive "mav" in s. 12(2) S.C.A. to hold that breach 
ol au S (¡.A condition only gives use to a right of rejection il the nature and consequences o f the breach 
justify it. although no court has as yet so held.
I
52 U.N.B LAW JOURNAL  •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
. . . [T]he defect in the scale complained of by the defendants was of so 
trifling a character that one would think that the offer of the plaintiffs to 
the defendants—that they (the defendants) put in the glass and charge the 
cost to the plaintiffs—might have been accepted. However, the duty of the 
plaintiffs was to supply to the defendants at Hafford a scale complete in all 
its parts, and it was also their duty to replace the broken glass. They did 
not do so. and I do not see how, in view of the provisions of s. 16 [in New 
Brunswick s. 15(b)! of the Sale of Goods Act, and the meaning given to the 
words ‘merchantable quality' by the authorities on the point, any other 
decision can be reached than that the defendants were within their legal 
rights in refusing to accept the scale.'4 [insertion added]
B. SELLER S INABILITY TO EFFECT CURE
T h e  seller, co n fro n te d  by a techn ica l-m inded  buyer seek ing  to  reject 
for b reach  o f  cond ition , e n co u n te rs  a fu r th e r  anom aly  u n d e r  the  g enera l 
sales law, viz. his inability to  “c u re ” his b reach  o f  cond ition . T h e  chance to 
cu re  a d efec t w ould p rov ide  th e  seller in m any cases with an  im p o rtan t 
o p p o rtu n ity  to  m ake good on his con trac tu a l u n d e rta k in g  w ithout d e fea tin g  
the  reasonab le  ex pecta tions o f  the  buyer. But such a righ t is no t recognized  
u n d e r  th e  g enera l sales law.15
T h e  issue o f  the  seller’s o p p o rtu n ity  to  e ffec t cu re  was again  recently  
before  th e  co u rt in Fnskin v. Holiday Chevrolet—Oldsmohile Ltd., w here  co u n ­
sel fo r th e  d e fe n d a n t au tom otive  d ea le r a rg u e d  that th e  cond itions o f  
m erchantab ility  an d  fitness im plied  u n d e r  th e  M anitoba Consumer Protection 
Act [which a re  the sam e as those  im plied  u n d e r  th e  New B runsw ick’s S.G.j4.] 
should  be co n stru ed  in such a way as to give th e  seller a reasonab le  o p ­
p o rtu n ity  to m ake the  goods sold m erch an tab le  o r  reasonably  fit fo r th e  
p u rp o se  in ten d ed . T h is  subm ission p ro m p te d  M r. Ju stice  O ’Sullivan of the 
M anitoba C ourt o f  A ppeal to conclude:
With respect, I think that counsel lor the defendant has misconstrued the 
conditions. It appears that many dealers m used cars share the same mis­
conception. Once the conditions of the contract have been breached, any 
question of the vendor’s conduct is irrelevant and the vendor cannot ab­
rogate the purchaser’s right of rescission.
. . . (O)nce it is established that there has been a breach, the plaintiff has 
the right to reject the goods. Ihe defendant cannot sav he has not had ,111 
opportunity to remedv the defec ts. The warranty is not a warranty to render 
fit. It is a warranty (or condition) that the goods are. at ihe time of sale and 
delivery, merchantable or reasonably fit.
. . . [O Jnce it is fo u n d  th a t th e re  is a b reach , th e  d e fe n d a n t c an n o t d e fen d
011 th e  basis th a t th e  goods cou ld  Ik- re n d e re d  m e re h a n ta b le o r  fit by repair.* '’
,4| 19251 I I) I K m>4. per Martin |.A  ai p 870 (S.,sk<. A )
"For an exhaustive com pari v  >11 and critique of die Anglo-Canadian and American positions, see Ontario 
Sale nf ( iimid\ Hrpxrt. supra, footnote I !V at pp 444-4tir> li should In- noled that the general sales lav» 
recognizes a tight to cure defective tender 111 one tvj>e ol case. ru where the tune tor delivery has not 
expired Sr%thf\ &  C.o v Ihxis Knitting ( o  (1922). 52 0  1 K 175 (Out ( A )
V1 1977), 72 I) I K (3d) 2H9 at pp 291-292 (Man ( \  i
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II NEW BRUNSWICK SOLUTION— A NEW REMEDIAL REGIME
I. INTRODUCTION
T h e  Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act dram atically  a lters the  
recou rse  available to  co n su m ers  fo r b reach  o f  a seller’s o r  su p p lie r’s obli­
gations in con trac ts  fo r th e  sale o r  supp ly  o f  co n su m er p ro d u c ts  by the 
c rea tion  o f  a special co n su m er rem ed ia l reg im e. The New B runsw ick C o n ­
su m er P ro tection  Project m ade  specific re fe ren ce  to the  prim acy an d  d if­
ficulty o f  devising su itab le  rem ed ies to en fo rce  an  e x p a n d e d  set o f  co n su m er 
rights. As sta ted  in th e  First Report: “T h e se  rem ed ies m ust be effective, but 
they m ust also be fa ir in s trik ing  a reasonab le  balance betw een the  co n ­
flicting in terests o f  th e  parties to  th e  co n trac t.”37 In o rd e r  to  assess the 
relative d eg ree  o f  success the  New B runsw ick legislation achieves in strik ing 
this reasonab le  balance betw een buyers an d  supp lie rs  o f  co n su m er p ro d ­
ucts, we shall ex am in e  th e  new  rem ed ia l reg im e against th e  fo rego ing  
b ackground  o f  th e  g enera l sales law. A com parison  will be m ade with the  
rem edial reco u rse  p rov ided  co n su m ers  in p reced en t an d  subsequen t re ­
form  proposals an d  legislative en ac tm en ts  in o th e r  com m on law jurisd ic­
tions.
2. ABOLITION OF DISTINCTION BETW EEN CONDITIONS AND  
WARRANTIES
T h e  First Report of the Consumer Protection Project, as no ted  in Part I. 
reco m m en d ed  crea tio n  o f  a u n ita ry  w arran ty  schem e fo r New B runsw ick’s 
co n su m er p ro tec tion  leg islation .38 As a resu lt, the  Consumer Product Warranty 
and Liability Act d e p a r te d  from  the  basic ap p ro ach  o f  the Sale of Goods Act 
and  c rea ted  tw o ca tegories o f  w arran ties: (1) “exp ress w arran ties” desig ­
nating  those ob ligations u n d e rta k e n  by th e  seller because o f  w hat he savs 
orally, in w riting  o r  in advertis ing  abou t his co n su m er p ro d u c t,39 an d  (2) 
“im plied w arran tie s” d esig n a tin g  those  sta tu to rily -im posed  g u a ran tees  o f  
the ch a rac te r an d  quality  o f th e  se ller’s co n su m er p ro d u c t.40 T h is  a b ro ­
gation o f  the  co n d itio n -w arran tv  d icho tom y encom passed  two im p o rtan t 
corollaries. Firstly, it nega ted  th e  ru le  which en titles th e  aggrieved  buyer 
to rescission only in cases o f  b reach  o f  cond ition  an d  o therw ise restricts 
him  to dam ages fo r  b reach  o f  w arran ty . Secondly, it p e rm itted  a new 
legislative a p p ro a c h  to  deal with th e  anom alies in h e re n t in the  g enera l sales 
law by v irtue  o f  section 12(4) o f  the  Sale of Goods Act which, as no ted  above, 
m akes the  aggrieved  b u y e r’s righ t to rescission d ep e n d e n t u p o n  th e  legal 
concepts o f  accep tance  and  passing  o f  p ro p erty . T h e  dev e lo p m en t o f  a 
new legislative a p p ro a c h  necessitated  reso lu tion  to im p o rtan t questions
'  Supra, footnote 13. at p 107
* Supra, footnote 1, at p 143 if 
"Section 4< 1) C P W' L A
■"'Sections K-12 ( ' P W /, ,4
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co n ce rn in g  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  rem ed ies  fo r b reach  o f  th e  “new -style” w ar­
ran ties, th e  m ost im p o rta n t be ing  w hen a b u y er shou ld  be en titled  to
C.P.W .L.A. rejection  rig h ts  an d  u n d e r  w hat c ircum stances he shou ld  lose 
them .
3. A P P U C A T IO N  OF THE REMEDIAL REGIME
It is im p o rta n t to  recognize th a t, w ithout m ore , all C.P.W.L.A. w ar­
ran ties app ly  equally  in fav o u r o f  all buyers.41 T h e  Act does no t d iffe ren tia te  
betw een  co n su m er buyers an d  business buyers o f  a co n su m er p ro d u c t.42 
U nlike th e  w arran ties, how ever, th e  rem ed ies fo r  b reach  o f  w arran ty  will 
d iffe r  acco rd in g  to  th e  type o f  b u y er p u rch asin g  the co n su m er p ro d u c t. 
Section 13 o f  th e  C.P.W .L.A. p rov ides as follows:
13 Where
(a) there is a contract for the sale or supply of a consumer product and 
the buyer makes or holds himself out as making the contract in the 
course of a business; and
(b) there is a contract for services or for labour and materials and a 
consumer product is supplied along with the services or labour;
the remedies in sections 14 to 22 for breach of a warranty provided by this 
Act do not apply, but the remedies that would normally be available under 
the law for breach of the warranty shall be deemed to be remedies provided 
by this Act.
T h u s, th e  new C.P.W .L.A. rem edia l reg im e is basically restric ted  to co n ­
su m er b uyers.4* A businessm an w ho pu rchases a con su m er p ro d u c t for 
resale is restric ted  to th e  rem ed ies o therw ise p rov ided  u n d e r  the  g enera l 
sales law fo r b reach  o f  w arran ty .44 T h e  w ord “w arran ty" is defined  in section 
1 o f  th e  C.P.W .L.A. in its b road  prom issory  sense as “a te rm  of the  con trac t 
th a t is a p ro m ise ,” an d  it th e re fo re  encom passes cond itions, w arran ties an d  
in te rm ed ia te  stipu la tions in th e  n o m en c la tu re  o f  th e  genera l sales law. T h e  
follow ing exam ple  will serve to  illustra te . l ake th e  case of an  in te rm ed ia te  
su p p lie r w hose salesm an negligently  resp o n d s to  a re ta iler 's  question  co n ­
ce rn in g  th e  ap p ro x im a te  retail resale price of a pa rticu la r co n su m er p ro d ­
uct. T h e  re ta ile r, rely ing on  that rep re sen ta tio n , purchases a supply of the 
consum er product in question from  the supplier's salesman. The C.P.W.L.A.
4tFor a full discussion see Pan I. supra, footnote 1. a! pp 135-139
‘^Business buyers, however, who purchase a consumer product in the course of a business ma> expressly exclude or 
restrict any of the C.P W L A warranties: s 26
‘The C P W L A  in its entirety is inapplicable to pnvate sales s 2<2)(a) The position ol a business huyer who 
purchases a consumer product in his pnvate capacity for his personal use is fully equaled with that ol a consumer 
buyer in terms of remedial recourse So, too, where a businessman purchases a consumer product partly tor his own 
use and partly for use in his business, he does not "purchase in the course of a business" within the meaning ot 
section 13 providing he acquires it "primarily for use lor personal, family or household purposes" see s 1(2)
“ Note, however, that a businessman who suffers a "consumer loss" (defined in s 1 to include a loss that a person 
suffers in a business capacity to the extent that it consists of liability that he incurs lor a loss that is not sullered in a 
business capacity) at the instance of his purchaser retains his nght ot recourse against prior suppliers see sections 23 
and 26
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w ould, in th e  absence o f  special c ircum stances, d eem  the  salesm an’s re p ­
resen ta tio n  to  be a w arran ty  in th e  co n trac t betw een  th e  in te rm ed ia te  su p ­
p lier an d  th e  re ta ile r45 w ithou t th e  n eed  o f  re so rtin g  to  th e  uncerta in ties 
o f  th e  collateral co n trac t d o c tr in e .46 T h e  re ta ile r’s C.P.W .L.A. rem edies, 
how ever, will be those  to  w hich he w ould o therw ise be en titled  to u n d e r  
the  com m on law an d  th e  Sale of Goods Act. T h u s , assum ing  no  effective 
section 26 exclusion o r  restric tion , in d e te rm in in g  th e  re ta ile r’s rig h t to 
reject th e  goods, th e  salesm an’s rep re sen ta tio n  w ould m ost likely be sub­
jec ted  to th e  a priori classification process o f  the  S .G .A 47 Even if th e  re p ­
resen ta tion  w ere classified as a cond itio n , th e  c ircum stances w ould still have 
to exhib it th e  absence o f  any  com m on law o r  s ta tu to ry  bars to rescission 
in o rd e r  fo r the  re ta ile r to  succeed in re jec ting  th e  co n su m er products.
4. C .P .W .L A . REMEDIES
A. INTRODUCTION
In  fo rm u la tin g  a co n su m er rem ed ia l reg im e th e  New Brunsw ick leg­
islation had  to  reflect a m ajor policy choice in d e te rm in in g  u n d e r  what 
circum stances a co n su m er shou ld  be p e rm itted  to  cancel th e  con trac t and  
reject the  co n su m er p ro d u c t. Legislative exp erien ce  elsew here clearly il­
lustra tes the  b road  co n tin u u m  o f  p rospective reso lu tion .
U n d o ub ted ly  it w ould be m ost m unificen t from  the  co n su m er’s s tan d ­
poin t to  p rov ide  an  abso lu te  righ t to  cancel the  con trac t an d  reject the 
co n su m er p ro d u c t w ithout th e  necessity o f  justification . There is legal p rec­
ed en t in the  d irec t sales legislation o f  New B runsw ick48 an d  the  o th e r 
com m on law prov inces49 fo r such an ap p ro ach  with the  proviso  o f  a tim e 
lim itation w ithin which the  buyer m ust exercise rejection  rights. E xpand ing  
this to all con trac ts  fo r the  sale o r supply  o f  co n su m er p ro d u cts  would 
en tire ly  relieve the  co n su m er o f  th e  b u rd e n  o f  estab lish ing  a breach  o f 
con trac t an d  th e  fu r th e r  uncerta in ties  o f  estab lish ing  the n a tu re  o f  that 
breach . But the  cost o f  such legislative largesse w ould result in equivalent 
deg ree  o f  u n fa irn ess  tow ards sellers o f  co n su m er p ro d u c ts  in the  m ajority
*'This would be accomplished in the following manner section 4(2) would deem the salesman's representation to have 
been made by the supplier and section 441) would make that oral statement an express warranty insofar as the retailer 
relied upon it and it was not unreasonable for him to do so
“ For an application in similar circumstances under the general sales law see: Sodd Corporation Inc v Tessts (1977), 
17 O R (2d) 158 (Ont C*A )
47If. instead, the "intermediate term" approach was applied, the retailer's entitlement to rescission would initially be 
determined by examining both the nature of the term and the nature or extent of the breach see discussion of Cehave 
v Bremer Handelsgesellsi haft m b H . infra, at footnote 29
**The Direct Sellers Act, R S N B 1973, c. D-10 as am For a full discussion of New Brunswick's direct s;*les 
legislation, see Dore, “Consumer Protection in New Brunswick". (1970) 20 i ! N B L.J 66 at pp 73-76
4VThe Direct Sales Cancellation Act. R S A I9H0, c. D-35 as am . Consumer Protection Act. R S B.C. 1979. c. 65 
ss 13-18, The Consumer Protection Act, R S M 1970. c. C200. ss 59-65 as am.’ The Consumer Protection Act. 
R S O 1980, c 87. s. 21, The Direct Sellers Act. R S Nfld 1970, c 96 as am . Direct Sellers' Licensing and 
Regulation Act, S N S 1975, c. 9. Direct Sellers Act. R S P H I 1974. c D -10; The Direct Sellers Act. R S S 1978. 
c D-28
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o f  cases, ie. in n o n -d o o r-to -d o o r selling situations w here  sellers have p ro ­
vided to  co nsum ers precisely w hat they b a rg a in ed  for. It is a rg u e d  that 
consum ers in these  c ircum stances a re , o r  shou ld  be, b e tte r  p re p a re d  psy­
chologically fo r  th e ir  pu rch ases  an d , th e re fo re , less in need  o f  such radical 
legislative in te rv en tio n .50
F u r th e r  a long  th e  co n tin u u m , an d  only slightly less g en ero u s from  the 
co n su m er’s s tan d p o in t, w ould be to  p e rm it cancellation  o f  th e  con trac t and  
rejection o f  th e  co n su m er p ro d u c t fo r any b reach  o f  w arran ty  by the  seller. 
T h is in d eed  was th e  a p p ro a c h  o f  th e  A m erican  Uniform Sales Act which 
gave th e  b u y er a r ig h t o f  rejection  fo r any b reach  o f  con trac t, no m atte r 
how insignificant.’1 T h u s  ex p a n d in g  the  co n su m er’s rig h t o f  rejection w ould 
elim inate  th e  necessity fo r th e  co n su m er to  decide  w h e th e r a co u rt w ould 
reg a rd  th e  seller’s b reach  as sufficiently m ateria l an d  p rov ide  an effective 
rem edy  in all cases w h ere  the  co n su m er has not received precisely what he 
barga ined  for. A gain, how ever, th e  cost resu lts in an equivalen t d eg ree  o f 
u n fa irn ess  tow ards sellers insofar as this legislative ap p ro ach  potentially  
dep rives a seller in every case o f  b reach , even in cases o f  a technical o r 
insignificant b reach , o f  th e  e n tire  benefit he  expected  to derive from  the 
contract. It shou ld  be p o in ted  ou t tha t th e  legislative policy o f  favouring  
certa in ty  by resolving th e  rem ed ia l issue in this way was never fully achieved 
in the  U nited  S tates w here  a slow but steady judicial re trea t from  this “all 
o r n o th in g ” ap p ro ach  p rev a iled .52 T h is  led the ^aw  R eform  Com m ission 
o f  New S outh  W ales to  conclude  th a t “th e  A m erican exp erien ce  shows that 
even w hen th e  strict ru le  applies, co u rts  have fou n d  a way a ro u n d  it and  
thereby  ab ro g a ted  th e  certa in ty  which is hailed  as its c h ie f  v irtu e .”5’ T h e  
Com m ission w ent on  to  suggest tha t any ap p ea ran ce  o f  exactness in re ­
solving the  rejection  issue can only be illusory because questions o f  d eg ree  
a re  necessarily involved .54
T h e  fo reg o in g  leads us fu r th e r  a long  the  co n tin u u m  o f  legislative 
reso lu tion . Less g en e ro u s  to th e  c o n su m er but m ore  favourab le  to  th e  seller 
w ould be to p rov ide  th e  righ t to  cancel the  con trac t an d  reject the consum er
'°See Bndge & Buckley. Salts and Salts F inant mg in C amnia Casts ami M air rials < 19X11 at p 4 '
''Section 69(1) Uniform Salts Act. National Conference of Commissioners on Umlorm Stale Laws (American.
The Act e"en permitted the buyer to rescind after he was deemed to have accepted the goods sec sections fi9( I xd) 
and 69(3) In these circumstances, however, the buyer was unable to claim additional damages
'The Law Reform Commission of New South Wales in its Working Paptr on the Sale of Goods i Warranties. Rtmt dies. 
Frustration and Other Mtttrs) (New South Wales. 1975) documented this retreat from the indexible rule of rejection 
in the following terms at paras 13 14 and 13 16
Commercial usage was relied upon so to interpret the contract that no breach of warranty occurred, and 
where that was not possible and there was clearly a departure from the terms of the contract, albeit in a trivial 
or immaterial respect, resort was sometimes had to the language of section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act to deny 
the nght of rejection
This approach could not be used however if the seller's default was of sufficient import to require an 
adjustment of pnce Instead, the American courts tell back on such concepts as waiver, custom and mercantile 
practice to refuse rejection in favour of adjustment of pnce
”lbid , at para 13.17
*Id
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p ro d u c t only in the  case o f  m ajo r as o p p o sed  to  m in o r b reaches of w arran ty  
by the  seller. T h is  legislative a p p ro a c h  is suggestive o f  the  concept o f  b reach  
o f  cond ition  in the  Sale of Goods Act with one propitiatory difference: no longer 
would an a priori classification be required to determine whether the term breached 
was sufficiently important to entitle the aggrieved consumer to rescind. Instead, 
both the nature of the term that was breached and the consequences resulting 
therefrom would be examined in order to determine whether the breach was major. 
This, in part, is the appi 'ach adopted in the Saskatchewan Consumer Products 
Warranties Act.”  Under that legislation only wh*n the seller commits a substantial 
or non-remediable breach is the consumer ever tntitled to reject the product and 
recover any portion of the purchase price he has paid.56 This approach is compar­
atively more favourable to sellers insofar as it recognizes that a consumer should 
not be permitted to cancel the contract and reject the consumer product if in the 
circumstances the defeat could be repaired at less economic cost to both parties by 
requiring the consumer to retain the product and be reimbursed in damages for the 
deficiency. The associated cost, this time from the consumer’s standpoint, is an 
operational unfairness in a large number of cases where, because of the quantum 
of reimbursement involved, the consumer who has fully paid for the product is 
effectively dissuaded from commencing a legal action for damages. Under a con­
sumer remedial regime in which the primary remedy for breach of warranty lies in 
damages, recovery will often be at the seller’s pleasure.
The Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act occupies the middle ground 
between these last two points on the legislative continuum. The New Brunswick 
legislation generally provides the seller, unless the breach is major, with the op­
portunity to rectify his breach before the consumer can reject the consumer product. 
But. where the seller fails to rectify the breach, the consumer can then exercise his 
primary remedy—the right to reject the product— in all cases subject only to an 
overall 60 day time limitation (inapplicable to major breaches) and his acting within 
a reasonable time after discovering the breach.
We will now consider in detail the right of the seller to rectify his breach of 
warranty, the consumer's right to reject the consumer product, the consequences 
of rejection to the consumer and the seller, and the consumer’s right to damages.
B SELLER S RIGHT TO RECTIh Y THE BREACH 
(i) General
The seller’s willingness to repair or replace defective goods is a recurring and 
relevant factor in relation to the buyer's right of rejection in reform proposals and 
legislation. While there clearly emerges a universal trend toward substantial ex­
pansion of the seller’s right to cure defective tender, opinion is divided on the
MSS 1976-77. c 15 now K S S 1978. c C-30 as am . proclaimed effective November 6. 1977 except sections 4i 1), 
8 .9 . 10, 13(3), I4< 1 ). (2). 20( I ). 24. 25. 26. 29. V> proclaimed effective October 31, 1981 Other provisions contained 
in S S 1980-81. c 18 and S S 1979-80. c 17 proclaimed in force effective October 31. 1981 sections I6(2l. 17 I. 
V4<3) Hereinafter the Act ma> be referred to as the Saskatchewan Act
''’Section 2(K I Kb) For a full discussion of the Saskatchewan provision see Romero. "The Consumer Products War 
ranties Act (Part ID." ( 1980), 44 Susk L Rev 261 at pp 325-328
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desirable parameters of that expansion, viz. whether the seller’s right to cure should 
be restricted to minor or less serious breaches of warranty or whether it should also 
encompass a right to cure major or more serious breaches.
Section 20 of the Saskatchewan Consumer Products Warranties Act, for ex­
ample, restricts the seller’s opportunity to “ make good the breach”  to those cases 
where the breach is “ remediable and not of substantial character.’’ In so providing, 
it follows the recommendations of the 1972 Ontario Warranties Report:
Where the breach is remediable and the breach is not a [sic] fundamental character, 
the retailer or manufacturer should have a reasonable opportunity to make good the 
breach, including any breach in the implied warranties of title, freedom from en­
cumbrances, and quiet possession.57
The Ontario Law Reform Commission was recently o f the opinion, in its 1979 
Report on the Sale of Goods, that the right to cure should be extended to include 
cases where the seller has committed a “ substantial breach" o f the contract.'* In 
so recommending, it followed the precedent of the American Uniform Commercial 
C ode"* which does not restrict the type o f nonconforming tender that may be the 
subject to cure.NI In the Ontario Law Reform Commission’s opinion the operative 
test should be “ not the nature o f the non-conformity, but whether the non-conformity 
can be cured without unreasonable prejudice, risk or inconvenience to the buyer.“ '’1 
Thus, section 7.7(2) of the Ontario Draft Sales Rill" confers on the seller the right 
to cure even a substantial breach where this can be done without prejudice to the 
buyer:
7.7(2) Except in a case of late tender or delivery amounting to a substantial 
breach, where the buyer,
(a) rightfully rejects a non-conforming tender or delivery, whether before 
or after the time for performance has expired; or
(b) revokes his acceptance of the good*.
the seller has a reasonable time to cure the non-conformity,
(c) if he seasonably notifies tlu* buyer;
"Supra, footnote 13. at p 45
'"Supra, footnote 13, at pp 463-464 Note that the 147*J Ontario Sale o f  Goods Report recommendation addressed 
itself to the feasibility of a general right to cure and was not restricted, as was the IV72 Ontario Warranties Report 
recommendation, to the case of a seller's right to cure in consumer sales
'‘'Hereinafter, the statute may be referred to as the U.C.C  All citations of the U.C.C. are to the 1972 Official Text
"The U.C.C. distinguishes between cases where the seller makes a non-conforming tender before the time tor per 
formance has expired and those cases where the time for performance has expired In the former case the seller's right 
to cure is absolute section 2 <>(Wi I ) stipulates that where goods are rejected because they do not conform to the contract 
and the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may promptly notify the buyer of his intention to cure 
and may then make a proper delivery within the contract time In the case where the time for performance has expired, 
the seller's right to cure is dependent upon the seller's reasonable foresight, le did he have reasonable grounds for 
belief that the tender would be acceptable section 2-50X<2) provides that where gixtds are rejected as non-contomiing 
which the seller reasonably thought would, in the circumstances of the case, be acceptable with or without an adiustment 
in price, he is given the opportunity of making a proper tender within a further reasonable time
Supra, footnote 13. at p 464
^Contained in the Ontario Sale o f Goods Report. Vol III. \upra. footnote 13. at pp 4-65
THE C.P.W.L.A. CONSUMER REMEDIAL REGIME 59
(d) if the non-conformity can be cured without unreasonable prejudice, risk 
or inconvenience to the buyer; and
(e) if the type of cure offered by the seller is reasonable in the circum­
stances.6'
T his m ost recen t position  advocated  by th e  O n ta rio  Law R eform  C om ­
mission in th e  co n tex t of gen era l sales is sim ilar to th a t advanced  earlie r 
by the  Law R eform  C om m ission o f  New South  W ales which recom m ended  
in the  sam e con tex t th a t th e  seller be given an o p p o rtu n ity  which is rea ­
sonable in th e  c ircum stances to  rem edy  any d efect with the a d d ed  proviso 
th a t any loss suf fe red  by the  b u y er as a resu lt o f  defective p erfo rm an ce  o r 
this ex tension  o f  tim e be recoverab le  by him.*4
New B runsw ick 's fo rm ula tion  of the  seller's righ t to  cu re , like Sas­
katchew an's, is m odelled  on th e  ea rlie r reco m m en d atio n  of the  O n ta rio  
Law R eform  C om m ission co n ta in ed  in the  Ontario Warranties Report. 1 hus. 
section 14(1) of the  Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act provides .is 
follows:
14(1) Where the seller is in breach of a warranty provided by this Act. the
buver shall give him a reasonable opportunity to rectify the breach, unless
(a) the buyer is unable to do so, or is unable to do so without significant 
inconvenience; or
(b) the breach is a major breach.
The ra tionale  fo r refu sin g  to ex ten d  the  seller’s right to rectify to cases o f 
m ajor o r  m ore  serious b reaches is no t set out in the First Report. O th e rs  
have o p in ed  tha t it is p resum ab ly  in the  case o f  a m ajo r breach th a t the  
co n su m er m ight tru ly  lose confidence in his seller an d  fo r this reason  both 
the  Saskatchew an a n d  New B runsw ick legislation rightly  deny  the  seller a 
sta tu to ry  righ t to  cu re  in these c ircum stances.67’
I l it -  I i n / n n n  S i d  i n l  (  , im mI \  \ i I ( a d o p t e d  . i l  I l ie-  S i \ n  - I I i n <  I \ i i i i u . i l  M e e t i n g  n i  I I n  I m t o i  i n  L a w  (  i m l c i  c n c  e
I I I  C . 111.1( 1.1 SC C  I ’ l l «  e C ' c l l U g S ,  \ | ) | H l l t l l \  S  .11 | l | » .  I S  V 3 2  | I l l l l  O )  | >OI  , I | C S  .1 | >l  l I I  I I tt  l l l l l  l I l l l l  - W i l l )  I »  N | H l  I 
t u  l l i i -  s t  III I s  i t l i l l y r . i l  l< >1 I s  « o n  | i l c i l  \ \  n i l  s u h s l a i i t i a l l x  t i n  v i l  i l l '  I m i l l  I n  » H i « - . i s  l i n d e l  I I n  O u l u  i n • I  h u l l  S»//< v 
H i l l  s i c  '2 7  7 ( 2 l
^W orking Paper on the Sale of (.nods, \upta. footnote 52, .it paras 13.20 .mil 13.23.
"T his was the io n , lusion ot the Alberta Institute ot I„iw Research anil Retorm in its Report on The L'ni/oim 
Sale of Goods .Act (F.dmonton. Ortober. 1982): see p. IHH See also Komero. >upta. footnote .'><>. at pp. 322- 
323 Proiessoi Baet on the othet hand, questioned the necessity ol earn ing consumer protection to this 
extreme in a papet entitled "Consumer Protection and the Sale ol (>oods" (Mas. I97.r>), prepared tor the 
Allierta Institute ol Lavs Research and Relorm:
All ol the consumer's legitimate needs are sutficientl\ covered in the concept ot v\hat is an effective 
cure. His legitimate interest is that in the end he vwill hast- a product whic h complies with the contract 
at least as to qualtts II realh doesn't mallet how giossh detective the goods were when the\ were 
hrst tendered as long as thev are completeU cured hoi instance, in the sale ol a new I \  . in the 
end it matteis little to the consumei whether the delect was a malfunctioning line tuner oi a picture 
tube, as long as eiihei detect has tieen corrected h\ repair oi replacement and the resulting product 
satihes the lo i.tia i I (>1 i ourse. it the repaired I V does not ha\e  the same qualities as a new I \  
then the delect has not been cured
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( I*) E xceptions
T h ere  are three exceptions to the seller’s right to rectify contained in 
section 14(1). In descending o rd e r o f im portance they are: (1) if the breach 
is a m ajor breach, (2) if the buyer is unable without significant inconvenience 
to provide the seller with a reasonable opportunity  to rectify, and (3) if the 
buyer is for any reason unable to provide the seller with a reasonable 
opportunity  to rectify.
a. Major Breach
T h e  concept o f “m ajor breach” is not defined in the Consumer Product 
Warranty and Liability Act. T h e  first New Brunswick case to deal with the 
issue was G auvin and LeBlanc v. Dryden Motors Ltd.™' where the plaintiffs 
sought to set aside a contract for the sale o f a used sports car on the grounds 
that the car was fraudulently  m isrepresented to them and had serious 
defects. In allowing rescission, Mr. Justice M eldrum  held that the phrase 
“major breach” in section 14(1 )(b) o f  the C .P .W .L .A . meant a breach “going 
to the root o f the contract.”67 He then curiously went on to quote the 
paragraph in Halsbury (3rd Ed.) which differentiates between conditions 
and warranties in a contract of sale and which concludes that “the test is 
whether perform ance of the stipulation goes to the whole consideration ol 
the o ther party; if it does, the stipulation is a condition . . .”h* The learned 
judge then concluded with respect to the case l>efore him that:
. . . [t]he representations all false, as to previous use, si/e  and type of m otor, 
quality of vehicle and condition  o f  roof, even if som e individually might 
have l>een term ed warranties, com bined m ake the vehicle totally unfit for 
the purpose for whic h it v\as (»night. and in fac t for which it was sold. 1 hev 
constitute a major breach.'’1'
While there can be little quarrel with the result in ( iau vin , the reasons 
lot decision, with respect, exhibit a failure to appreciate or a refusal to 
recognize the essential nature ol a major breach and tlu- changes in tins 
area ol the law contem plated In the C.P.W I..A. In one respect the reasons 
displa\ a reluctance to abandon the S.G ..\. condition-w arrant\ dichototm  
and a judicial inclination toward tlit* cointortabili(\ ol establishing what 
would have been a breac h of condition under the S.G.A. and. In analogy. 
coih hiding that suc h would constitute a major breac It undet the- ( ./Ml I \ 
Yet. following the- tec ouunendations ol 11 it* Ontario Wat rantics Report:' the 
New Brunswick Eirst Report, ' and the precedent ol the- Hong Kong Fit 
Shipping < ase,7-’ it is < Icat that the C..P.W .I..A. attem pts to el lee t a c lean In c.ik
«•( l ‘*M 1). 34 S H K  (2d) 143 l \  B B ).
^ Ib td  . at p I4H 
w lbul . ai p 149 
Id
"Supra, footn ote I 3. a( |>|> 44 10 
' ‘Supra. foo tn o te  13. at pp  133-137  
T: Supra. too tli.ite  30. and ¿ u o m p a m m g  text
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from  the S.G.A. precedent by refusing to m ake the availability o f  its rem ­
edies exclusively dep en d en t upon the natu re o f the broken term . In ano ther 
respect the reasons p u t forth  in G auvin  equate the C .P .W .L .A . m ajor breach 
concept with the com m on law doctrine o f  fundam ental breach. Indeed, 
the latter has been judicially defined in precisely the same term s used by 
Mr. Justice M eldrum , viz. a breach which goes to the root o f the contract.™ 
It would be u n fo rtuna te  for New Brunswick consum ers if this judicial 
equation ultimately prevails. It has long been recognized that circumstances 
am ounting to fundam ental breach may be quite d ifferen t and in fact m ore 
serious from  what m ight be called an “ord inary” breach o f condition or 
warranty using the S.G.A. nom enclature.74 Many situations, therefore, may 
arise where the breach in question, while not qualifying as a fundam ental 
breach per se, may qualify un d er some lesser standard  that has regard  to 
both the natu re o f the term  broken and the consequences o f the breach. 
Equating the C .P .W .L .A . concept o f  m ajor breach with the com m on law 
doctrine o f fundam ental breach will, it is subm itted, have the effect o f 
depriving the consum er in these cases o f an im m ediate right to reject the 
consum er product. N either would this equation always work in favour o f 
expanding the seller’s statutory right to rectify. Breach o f the seller's title 
obligation has generally been regarded  un d er the general sales law as tan ­
tam ount to fundam ental breach.7S I f  the courts so restrict the C.P .W .L .A . 
concept o f  m ajor breach, the seller could in all suc h cases lose his statutory 
right to rectify. This would not accord with the recom m endation in New 
Brunswick’s First Report that “the seller should be given a reasonable op­
portunity to rectif y his breac h, including a breach of the title obligation, unless 
it is a m ajor o r irrem ediable breach.”76 (emphasis added).
New Brunswick cases subsequent to G auvin  in which the “m ajor breach” 
issue has arisen have done little to clarify judicial in terpretation. In Audet 
v. Central Motors L td . 77 the plaintif f sought to rejec t a used autom obile on 
account, inter alia, o f  an oil leak. T he  leak was found to be a very m inor 
problem  which could have been repaired  at a cost o f $2.40. Mr. Justice 
Stevenson quite predictably found, albeit in obiter dicta, that ”[t]he defects 
in the car were not so serious that failure to rem edy them  would be a m ajor 
breach within the m eaning o f the Act . . .”7M In Gallant v. L a m  Wood Used
7vThis was the defin ition  pul forth  by Lord Reid in Sui\se Atlnntiqur Sm ir tt d ’Arm em ent M aritime S  .-V v. \  V 
Rottrrdamsehe Kolrn C.entrale, |IW ifi| 2  All F..R. 61 at p. 71 (H  I..). Most retetitlv the New H m m w u k  Court 
o f  A ppeal .it Thnma\ F.quitrment l t d  v Sperr\ R and  C.anada l  td  f t  nl ( l (.IH2). 40  \  B R (2d) 271 at p 283. 
noted  that " |a | fu nd am en ta l hrea< h has lieen  varionsh  ties« ritx-cl as o n e  that tfoes to the root of the contra« t 
or. an event (fiat d ep rives the plaintiff of siihstaniiallv the w h ole benefit he was to obtain  u n d ei the «ontra« I 
or. an accum ulation  of d e te d s  w h u h  taken en  m asse («institute su« h a breath  n,,,n K io the root of the  
contract . . ." (per Stratton J.A.).
T4See the «ases cite«! in Fridm an, \uprti. foo tn o te  IH, at pp  3 0 8 - .il 4. 1 he exten t to w h u h  t fit- «ou it will 
regard a breath  as fu n d am en ta l, rather than as breath  of con d ition , w arrant) or "interm ediate" term  is 
illustrated bv Alberta C.aterers l  td  v R Yoll/in (Albert») l.td. ( I**77). Ml I) I R. (3d) (»72 (Alta. S < ).
7'Se*. for exam p le . Row land thi<aU. 11923 | All F R Rep 27 0  at pp. 2 7 4-27f» pet Atkin I | (f'>K <• A.I: 
Hulterworth v. Kmgsway Motors l t d  . (I9f»4| 2 All F R (iiM at p. 7(M) pel Pearson |. ( f u g  ( j  B.)
7bSupra. foo tn o te  13. at p. f>8 anil p 133.
77( 1 9 8 1), 35 V B  R (2d) 143 (N .B .Q  B ).
7*lhtd, at p. 145
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Cars L td .,19 w here a used vehicle was sold “as is—w here is,” Dickson J. 
rejected the p la in tiffs claim for rescission o f  the basis o f  m ajor breach after 
finding that the plaintiff had overused the car without du e  care and p ro p er 
m aintenance. And in McGouey v. Lawson Motors L td., w here the plaintiff 
b rought an action against the defendan t used car dealer for rescission on 
the sale o f a used car which collapsed from  rust 3,000 miles and app ro x ­
imately seven weeks after purchase, Mr. Justice Barry simply com m ented: 
“I consider that the rusted fram e was a m ajor breach o f w arranty entitling 
the plaintiff to reject o r rescind.”84' As a result o f these decisions the pa­
ram eters o f the C .P .W .L .A . m ajor breach concept must await fu rth e r judicial 
o r legislative clarification. In the interim  it is instructive to exam ine a rep ­
resentative sam pling o f related and com parable concepts contained else­
where in proposals and legislation.
U nder the Saskatchewan Consumer Products Warranties Act, as noted 
earlier, the retailer seller o r m anufactu rer is perm itted to cure where the 
breach is “rem ediable and not o f a substantial character,”81 but no such 
right is given w here the breach “is o f  a substantial character or not re ­
m ediable.”82 T he  Saskatchewan concepts o f “substantial” and “non-sub- 
stantial” breach, it is interesting to note, are used interchangeably with the 
concepts o f “m ajor" and “m inor” breach by Professer Rom ero throughout 
his excellent and exhaustive articles dealing with the Saskatchewan legis­
lation.8S T h e  Act itself defines "breach o f  a substantial chracter” to occur 
in the following cirsumstances:
(i) [where] a consum er product, or the level o f  perform ance o f  the retail 
seller or m anufacturer of a consum er product, departs substantially 
from  what consum ers can reasonably expect, having regard to all the  
relevant circum stances o f  the sale o f  the product, including the d e ­
scription o f  the product, its purchase price, the statutory warranties 
and express warranties o f  the retail seller or the m anufacturer of the  
product; or
(ii) [where] a consum er product is totally or substantially unfit for all the  
usual purjjoses of such product or for any particular purpose for which, 
to the know ledge of the retail seller, the product is being lioughl;"'
'u( 1982). SH N B R (2d) 2b2 (N B Q .B .).
*'(1982). 42 S  B R (2d) 22 5  at p 231 (N  B .Q .B  ) W h ilf Barrs | d id  not m ake re lrrc iH e to am  s|k-ciIic 
test in reaching tins con clu sion , it is in terestin g  to specu late on  w hethei or not the- rusted tram e w ould  
have con stitu ted  a major breach u n d ei the test su ggested  in (ia u v m .
"'Section 20( 1 )(a)
1,2S u p ra , footn ote 56.
" 'R om ero. " I he C onsu m er Products W arranties Act." (1 9 7 8 -1 9 7 9 ) 4H Sa\k I R r r  H| and I he ( o n su in e i 
Products W arranties Act (Part II)." \u fnn . fo o tn o te  5b, and  particularU pp  .119-W I
“'Sec t ion  2<c ) l o  d a t e  tw o S ask a tc hew a n  cases  have  dea lt  vs1111 t h e  substan ti a l b ie . ich  issue l i i r h r t l  s 
S hrruoixt < ht r m l r t  ( )ld  s m a b l l r  I. t i l  f t  i l l  ( 1981 ). 8 Sask. K J9I> (Savk O  B I. a n d  W ihhIIi \ \ \ l r \  \ I / i f i l / t i m  t \  
/Vi/ 11982). lb  Sask R. 24 (Sask. ( V l . i e v g  I :< S.csk K 124 (Sask Sut I ( t .). w Inc h is pa t tic ulai l\ n o te w o i  th \  
in tha t  th e  c o n s u in e i ' s  c laltli foi lesc issioii was tiltimalc ls u p h e l d  o n  the- basis tha t  a c o n g e i  ies ol defec ts 
a i n o u n t e d  in th e  a g g r e g a te  to a b r e a c h  of w a r r a n t s  of a substan ti a l ch a ra c te i  w h e r e  tlit stove  p u r c h a s e d  
rec |u i red  te n  s e r \ k  e c alls foi a v a l i c t v  of p to b l e in s  See al so  / m s  \ . H < > \u l l . n i n l r l .  I p i i  I I I  ( < R ep  >21 
( In d .  SiifHi 1972). w h e ie  a n u m l x i  o l uiiiioi d e l e c t s  a m o u n t e d  to " s u b s t a n t i a r  ii onco ii lo itu itx  with in  
I ( ( 2 ‘»08
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T he objective test inherent in the Saskatchewan definition of substantial 
breach, viz. w hether the defect substantially departs from what the rea­
sonable consum er would expect, can be com pared with an alternate test o f 
the seller’s reasonable foreseeability as incorporated  in the definition o f 
“substantial breach” in section 1.1(1)24 o f the Ontario Draft Sales Bill, viz. a 
breach “that the party  in breach foresaw or ought reasonably to have fo­
reseen as likely to im pair substantially the value o f the contract to the o ther 
party .” In form ulating this definition the O ntario  Law Reform Commission 
was expressly o f the view that the com m on law doctrine o f fundam ental 
breach im posed too stringent a test to govern the aggrieved party’s right 
to reject nonconform ing goods:
We think it should he sufficient if  the aggrieved party has been prejudiced  
by the breach to such a d egree that it would be unreasonable to require  
him to continue with the contract and to confine him self to a claim in 
dam ages. He should not have to  show that the breach has totally underm ined  
the value o f  the bargain . . .**
New Brunswick’s concept o f  m ajor breach, like Saskatchewan’s concept 
o f substantial breach, followed a precedent recom m ended by the O.L.R.C. 
in its earlier Ontario W arranties Report which suggested that the seller’s right 
to cure be restricted to those cases “where the breach is not o f a fundam ental 
character.” This concept was defined in the Report as meaning:
(I) T hat the product departs significantly in characteristics and quality 
from  the contract description; or
(ii) That the product is substantially unfit for its ordinary or specified  
purpose; or
(iii) T hat the product, in its ex istin g  condition , constitutes a potential hazard 
to the health or property o f  the purchaser or anv other person.''*’
Similarly, a param ount consideration in determ ining when the buyer may 
declare the contract avoided u n d er the United Nations International Sales 
ConventionH7 is w hether o r not the seller s breach is “fundam ental”. Article 
25 defines that term  as follows:
A breach o f  contract com m itted by one of the parties is fundam ental if it 
results in such detrim ent to the other party as substantially to deprive him  
of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach 
did not foresee and a reasonable persoii of the sam e kind in the same 
circum stances would not have foreseen such a result.
For C .P .W .L .A . purposes, a recurring  them e can be identified in these 
analogous form ulations. W hether designated a breach of substantial char-
""'OnUtno Sale uj Goods Report, supra, foo tn o te  13, at p. 518. 
m'Supru, foo tn o te  13, at p. 40.
1,7United S a t  ions Convention on Contracts lor the International Sale of ( ioods, V ienna. 10 A pril 19 8 0 , I N  l)o< 
A /C onf 97 IH I he work ot th e l i m e d  N ation s C om m ission  on  International I rade l..iw (I m u ra l) cu l­
m in ated  m th e  prom u lgation  in 1978 ot a (trail C onvention  on  contracts tor the in ternational sale of good s  
which was ad opted  ai a d iplom atic co n fere n c e  in V ien n a in 1980. and  w liu h  now awaits ratih iation  l>v the  
trad ing nations ot (tie w orld For a d etailed  d iscu ssion  see: H on n o ld . I niform I mu for International Sales 
I rider the ¡9H 0 U nited Xations Convention  (D even ter /N eth erlan d s k lu w er . 1982).
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acter [Sask.], substantial breach [Ont.], breach o f a fundam ental character 
[Ont.], o r fundam ental breach [U.N.], each form ulation em bodies to a lesser 
o r g reater degree the principle o f substantial deprivation o f the benefit o f 
the contract. In so doing each form ulation is closely akin to the U.C.C. 
concept o f “substantial im pairm ent o f  value”HM to the purchaser contained 
in section 2-608 which perm its the buyer to re tu rn  m erchandise after he 
has fully accepted the goods.w* T he  Code, like the C .P .W .L .A . in reference 
to “m ajor breach”, does not attem pt to define “substantial nonconform ity.” 
American courts, like their New Brunswick counterparts, have been re­
luctant to make any general statem ents concerning what constitutes sub­
stantial impairment. Nevertheless, subsidiary tests have proved most helpful 
in the United States in determ ining  substantiality, including a “m agnitude 
o f the defect” test,'"' a m ajor-m inor dichotom y,91 and a concept o f “ease of 
correcting the defect.”92 In the final analysis, however, as one court has 
noted “[e]ach case must be carefully exam ined on its own m erits to d e te r­
mine what is a ‘substantial im pairm ent o f value’ . . . [W]hat may cause one 
person great inconvenience o r financial loss, mav not ano ther.”9*
T h e end result o f the foregoing exam ination suggests that the New 
Brunswick concept of m ajor breach, like its analogous concepts elsewhere 
(defined and undefined), really concerns the issue of w hether o r not the 
consum er has been substantially deprived of the benefit of the contract 
because o f the seller’s breach o f warranty. In determ ining this issue regard 
must be had to the natu re  o f the w arranty that has been breached and the 
consequences o f  that breach o f w arranty to the consumer/*4 Form ulations
""Indeed. on e  of th e avow ed  p u rp oses o f th e O  1 K ( in ad op tin g  a m odest d efin ition  of "siilist.inti.il 
breach" in th e  O ntano  D raft Saif* Hill was "to give ou r courts th e benefit of A m eritan  ju risp ru d en te on  the 
C ode's test of substantial im pairm ent of value": O ntano  Saif »/ (.oods Report, supra. foo tn o te  13. at p MX
"‘‘U n d er the I ' the aggrieved  buyet has two in d ep en d en t rights to return m erih an d ise  1 he first tight 
of "rejection" is set ou t in s. 2-601 th rou gh  s. 2 -605  and  is geared to th e  |>eriod from  delivers to acceptance  
O n te  the a tte p ta n ie  |x>itit is passed |see  s. 2 -6 0 7 (2 )|. th e b uver’s right to return m erchan d ise is design ated  
revot alititi of acceptante"  and  is set out in s 2 -608
'"’N ote , ( 1970) M ich l. Rei 130 at p 135. See also: H aw kland. " (In tin g a li Im proper 1 entlet of I it le to  
C hattels: Past. Present and C om m ercia l C.txie". ( 1962) 46  Afinn I R ev  697
'"Zahnskie (.hevm let Inc v Smith. 24 0  A .2d 195» (N | Super 1968) See also Wilson \ Scampoli. 228  A 2d  
8 4 8  (I).C .C t.A pp !ÍW>7). I he tn ajot-nu n ot tfefet t test attributed t o /a h ru k ic  has not lieen  free fto m  i run ism  
see N ote. (1969) W a n e  I Rei' 938
'•‘See. for exam p le . Roim us \ Thompson 1 1rimiti M e rru n  C.omftans. 22 f \  2d 782 ( I’.i Sujhm I‘ . w hen  
the court fou nd  the p laintiff's tom p la in ts  to Ik- based on  insubstantial iio iu n n to rm ities  and le fu sed  to 
allow film to revoke Ins a t te p ta n ie  in circum stances w here Ins tar iluiui|>etl loutllv anti em itted  exhaust 
sm oke on his first drive out of tfie showrt>om I fie plaintiff had sought on that fust dav to revoke Ins 
a tte p ta n ie  without a fto td m g  the dt-alei a m  opportum tv to repau although  the trouble was ultimatelv 
correctable hv the adjustm ent of tw o loose en g in e  Ixilts t . f  Audet \ ( entrai Motors L td  . supra, footn ote 77 
fo r  a d iscussion of th e |iitlitial re t<ign ition  o l the ease ot turahilitv in tie te im im n g  the sub stan tia lly  o l a 
d efect, see N ote, supra. tool n ote 90
'“ Tiger Motor (u m p ttn > v M iM u r tn .  224 S 2d t>38 at p *>4*> (Ala S up  Ct 1969)
** I fus was also th e  t tint lusion of the New South  \ \  ales I .aw K efoi in ( tun m ission w hit h ret om m en tleti that 
a buyer should  fie able to re|et I good s and rescind the contract onlv w here the b reath  o l wairantv is a 
"material breach" in th e sen se  that "both th e nature of the term  and ttie con seq u en ces of the b rea ih  must 
lie looked at l>elore the right to term inate ttie con tra i! arises" see W orking I’nfrer on Sale of (¡oods. supra. 
foo tn o te  52. at para 13 40.
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elsewhere assist in focussing upon the duality o f the inquiry and negative 
any suggestion that the concept o f m ajor breach o r its counterparts can be 
equated with the com m on law concept o f  fundam ental breach o r the S.G.A. 
concept o f  breach o f condition. U nder the C .P .W .L .A . an aggrieved con­
sum er may immediately reject the consum er product and is relieved o f the 
obligation to provide his seller with a reasonable opportunity  to rectify if 
the seller’s breach o f w arranty constitutes a “m ajor breach.” W hatever else 
that concept may contem plate, it will often require som ething m ore than 
a breach o f condition u n d er the S.G.A. and may often comprise som ething 
less than a fundam ental breach u n d er the com m on law.
b. Significant Inconvenience to the Buyer
T he second exception to the seller’s right to rectify contained in section 
14(1) o f the C .P .W .L .A . occurs if the buyer is unable without significant 
inconvenience to provide the seller with a reasonable opportunity  to rectify. 
Cases o f overlap with the m ajor breach exception will obviously arise if the 
courts, as suggested above, place significant weight on the consequences 
suffered by the consum er as a result o f his seller’s breach o f warranty. A 
specific exception u n d er the rubric o f “significant inconvenience”, however, 
eliminates the necessity for courts and consum ers to have to decide in close 
cases w hether o r not that factor was, in the circumstances, in and o f itself 
sufficient to tip the scale in f avour o f a m ajor breach classification. Although 
the phrase “significant inconvenience" is not specifically defined in the Act, 
reference is later m ade to it in section 14(3) which exem pts the buyer, 
under ' ertain circum stances, from  any obligation to re tu rn  the consum er 
product to the seller for replacem ent or repair:
14(3) T h e buyer is not bound to return the product if  it cannot be returned  
without significant inconvenience to him because of its size, weight, m ethod  
o f  attachm ent or installation, or because o f  the nature o f  the breach.
Size, weight, m ethod o f attachm ent o r installation and nature o f the breach 
would also, it is subm itted, be illustrative considerations in attem pting to 
determ ine w hether the buyer is excused on the grounds o f significant 
inconvenience from  having to provide the seller with a reasonable o p p o r­
tunity to rectify his breach u n d er section 14(l)(a). But, at the same time, 
the considerations o f  convenience enum erated  in section 14(3), while ex­
haustive for purposes o f  that subsection, are not to be viewed as exclusive 
considerations o f  convenience for purposes o f section 14(1 )(a). It is im­
portant to keep in m ind that section 14(3) is designating those cases where 
the seller will have to attend  at the buyer’s premises o r elsewhere in o rder 
to take advantage o f any opportun ity  to cure.95 Section 14(1 )(a), on the
*' I hr (. /' W I. A in . im itation is quite sim ilar to section  1793.34 (3) o f  th e Song H n rrh  Consumer W arranty 
A il m tin- C alifornia Civil ( o d e  uhi» h. as n oted  bv Professor R om ero, \upru. footn ote 5fi, at p 325 . provides  
as follow s.
In the event a huvet is unable to  return n on -con form in g  good s to  the retailer d u e  to  reasons of size 
and w eight or m eth od  of attach m en t, or m eth od  of installation, or nature of the non-conform itv . the 
buvcr shall give n o tu e  of th e  n on-contorm itv  to the retailer. L’pon  receipt o f such notice of non- 
(on form itv . the leta ilet shall, at its o p tio n , service or repair the good s at the buyer s residence, or pick 
up the goods lor servu e ot repair, ot arrange lo t  transporting the good s to its p la te of business. T h e  
reasonable costs of transporting th e good s shall be at the retailer’s ex|>ense
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other hand, enunciates the seller’s statutory right to cure and the “signif­
icant inconvenience” exception simply designates ano ther way in which the 
seller may lose that right in its entirety.
c. Buyer’s Inability
T he th ird  exception to the seller’s right to rectify contained in section 
14(1) occurs where the buyer is simply unable to afford  the seller a rea­
sonable opportun ity  to rectify. T his exception presum ably addresses u n ­
usual circum stances not encom passed within the param eters o f the major 
breach and significant inconvenience exceptions.
At first sight it is difficult to im agine why the buyer’s inability to afford 
the seller a reasonable opportun ity  to cure in and o f  itself should be enum ­
erated  as an exception to the seller’s statutory right to cure. Surely if the 
buyer’s inability is occasioned by the very natu re o r consequences o f  the 
seller’s breach o f w arranty the m ajor breach exception is sufficient to deny 
the seller a statutory right to rectify in the circumstances. Similarly, if the 
buyer’s inability is based on m ajor condsiderations o f convenience, the 
significant inconvenience exception should suffice. U nder what circum ­
stances then would the seller be denied the right to cure on inability grounds 
alone? T he  obvious case appears to be where the buyer because o f use o r 
consum ption is simply unable to afford  the seller a reasonable opportunity  
to cure a m inor breach of warranty. A less obvious application might occur 
where the very time fram ew ork o f  the contract prevents the consum er 
from  afford ing  the seller a reasonable opportun ity  to rectify. T o  illustrate, 
take the case of a consum er who rents a colour television for a one-day 
period for the expressed purpose of watching the seventh and deciding 
hockey match in the Stanley C up  Finals. T u rn in g  on the set at gam etim e 
he is dismayed to discover the fine tun ing  control is defective and provides 
only seventy per cent of picture clarity. At this point in time the rental 
shop is closed and the consum er therefo re finds himself unable to afford  
the h irer any reasonable opportun ity  to rectify. In these circum stances the 
consum er need not concern him self with w hether or not the breach might 
later be classified as m inor on the basis that it could have been rectified by 
m inor internal adjustm ent. His inability within the time fram ew ork of the 
contract is in itself suf ficient, assum ing no f u rth er use, to allow him to rejec t 
the television and cancel the rental contract without affording the h irer 
any opportun ity  to rectify.
A literal application of the* inability exception discloses a potential 
C.P .W .L .A . anom aly occurring w here the consum er subsequently gives or 
resells the consum er product to a th ird  party. Assuming a defective produc t 
occasioned by a m inor breach of w arranty in the original contract of sale*, 
the subsequent purchaser o r donee is perm itted  to bring an action for 
dam ages against the original seller un d er section 23 o f the C. P .W .L .A . 
which, inter ah a , abolishes horizontal privity of contract for this purpose. 
While the seller retains responsibility for his original contractual u n d e r­
takings. he* appears to lose the benefit of his original statutory right to cure
THE C.P.W.L.A. CONSUMER REMEDIAL REGIME 67
because his buyer is unable to afford  him that o p p o rtu n ity , no longer having 
ow nership o f the consum er product.96 In these circum stances the subse­
quent ow ner o r donee may be able to sue the seller for dam ages without 
any requirem ent to afford  him a reasonable opportun ity  to rectify.
(in) Parameters o f Cure
a. No'definition of Permissible Cure
Given that the C .P .W .L .A . provides the seller in certain  circumstances 
with reasonable opportunity  to rectify his breach o f w arranty, there remains 
the question o f what form  that rectification may take. Alternatively stated, 
what constitutes a permissible cure? T h e  Act itself does not define “rectify” 
and, therefore, leaves the precise param eters open. Similarly, the Saskatch­
ewan legislation does not define what is encom passed in the seller’s right 
“to make good the breach”, although, in com m ents equally applicable to 
the C .P .W .L .A ., it has been suggested that a wide m eaning should be at­
tributed to the expression.1*” T he  O ntario  Law R eform  Commission, on 
the o ther hand, thought it desirable that the permissible types o f cure 
should be spelled out in some detail.97 Accordingly, the Ontario Draft Sales 
Bill defines “cu re” in section 7.7(1):
7.7— (1) In this section and in sections 7.9 and 8.8, “cu re” m eans,
(a) l ender or delivery of any missing part or quantity of the goods;
(h) tender or delivery of other goods or docum ents which are in conform ity  
with the contract;
(c) the rem edying o f  any other defect, including a defect in title; or
(d) a m oney allowance or other form  o f  adjustm ent o f  the term s o f  the 
contract.
T he list is adm ittedly generous toward sellers98 but has the decided advan­
tage o f attem pting to resolve, inter alia, two uncertainties that arise under 
the New Brunswick form ulation, viz. the seller’s right to rectify defects in 
title and the seller’s right to substitute.
b. Cunng Defective Title
W hether o r not the C .P .W .L .A . restricts a seller to rectify physical 
defects in the consum er product or also includes his righ t to rectify a defect 
in title is not free from doubt. While the consum er, u n d er section 14(1), 
is required to afford  the seller a reasonable opportun ity  to rectify any 
breach o f w arranty including, as recom m ended in the First R eport,"  a breach
"'See se< lion  2 1 (1 ) C .P .W I. A
R om ero, supra, foo tn o te  ñtí. al p 324
M7O ntario Sa if of (¡imhL  Hr port, supra, foo tn o te  13, at p. 464
I he <) I. R C . w hile at k u ow ledgm g anv error to lie on  the side o f  gen erosity , em p h asized  that th e seller  
w ould still have to establish that Ins p rop osed  tu re  was reasonable m the c m u m tta n ie s :  ibid. at p. 465.
“ Supra, fo o tn o te  76.
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of the title w arranty in section 8( 1 )(a), he does not have to do so where the 
breach is a “m ajor breach". As noted above, New Brunswick judicial in ter­
pretation o f that phrase is unclear. If the “substantial deprivation” test is 
applied and a court looks to both the natu re o f  the breach and its conse­
quences in determ ining the issue, a seller who belatedly is confronted with 
an outstanding defect in title would undoubtedly be perm itted to rectify 
his breach assum ing no substantial deprivation to the consum er. On the 
o ther hand, if m ajor breach, as suggested in Gauvin, is to be equated with 
breach o f condition o r fundam ental breach under the general sales law, 
the seller could well be denied the opportun ity  to rectify because o f the 
special im portance which the courts have traditionally attached to the sell­
e r’s title obligation.104' In o rd e r to resolve any uncertainty the broad defi­
nitional approach o f the Ontario D raft Sales Hill and the Uniform Sale of Goods 
A ct,l,)l containing specific inclusion of the seller’s right to cure defective 
title, is to be p referred .
c. R ig h t to Substitu te
W hether or not the C.P .W .L .A . right to rec tify includes, in appropriate  
circumstances, the right to substitute is also an area o f uncertainty in the 
New Brunswick form ulation .102 U ndoubtedly the Act provides that the right 
to rectify includes the right of the seller to repair o r to have the consum er 
product repaired  elsewhere at his expense:
14(2) Subject to subsection (3), where the seller h.»s a right to rectify the 
breach pursuant to subsection (1) and requests the buver to return the 
product, the buver shall return the product to the seller or to anv repair 
ia(ilit\ or service outlet that is operated or authorized by the seller, and the 
seller shall return the product to the buyer after he rectifies the breach, oi 
tnav supply a replacem ent if he is entitled  by law to do so.
T he concluding words in section 14(2), however, appear to distinguish 
between rectification and substitution and, in so doing, impose a potentially 
severe restriction on the seller’s right to rectify bv m eans of substitution in 
a large num ber o f consum er transactions. W here, for exam ple, a consum er 
has chosen a m ass-produced consum er product from  the seller's shelf, the 
resulting contract is recognized un d er the general sales law as one for the 
sale- of “specific goods,”10'* and the seller subsequently has no unilateral 
right of substitution. T h e  prohibition un d er the general sales law, in the 
absence of special agreem ent, is absolute:
"Sufn it, I <ii it tu itt 7 ’>
1 hr d efin ition  lo n ta m ed  m s  7 7(1) id the < hiittnti I tu ifi  S ulr\ Hill was .u lii |) in l with minor i lia n te s  in 
lh«- I inform  Ac l see s 7 7< 1 |
I his is also .i potential ,n r,i o l d iffu u ln  in Saskatc fiiw an  w here the A il d oes  not d eh n e  the param eters  
ot the sellei s power to "make good  the hreai h I’ro lessor  K om ero has .un ited  that the Sask alih ew an  
lo i initiation should  cover, in irt film , "the replacem ent o l the d efective  p rod u it h\ a new and d ifferen t 
one" see K om ero. foo tn o te  r»t>. at p 324
"'Spei itii good s are d efin ed  in the V ( , A see  foo tn o te  7
THE C.P.W.L.A. CONSUMER REMEDIAL REGIME 69
Specific goods are, therefore, goods which are clearly the goods to be sold  
under the contract. T hey  are m anifestly identified as the only goods which  
may be delivered by the seller in perform ance o f  his obligations. N o others 
will do. For exam ple, if  the contract is for the sale o f  a particular car or 
horse no other may be delivered by the seller in pursuance o f  the contract, 
even if  it mav be argued that what has been delivered is the exact equivalent 
o f  what was contracted for by the parties."*4
This may place New Brunswick sellers o f consum er products in a precarious 
position. While the general sales law does not confer a right o f substitution 
per se, it does perm it a seller to insert in his contract a provision entitling 
him to repair o r replace a defective product and to impose a corresponding 
restriction on the buyer’s right to reject. Indeed, as noted by the O ntario  
Law Reform Commission, this has long been a com m on practice in contracts 
for the sale o f  consum er durab les.105 T h e  New Brunswick seller, however, 
under the new legislation, is not perm itted  to so modify a C .P .W .L .A . rem ­
edy for breach o f any implied w arranty,"Hi including the implied warranties 
o f quality and fitness most often relied upon by consum ers. In such cir­
cumstances, the seller may find his contractual replacem ent rights defeated 
by the buyer’s statutory rejection rights.
O ne way o f avoiding the problem  would l>e to in terpret the words “if 
he is entitled by law to do so” in section 14(2) as including entitlem ent 
under the C .P .W .L .A . ra th er than restricting the m eaning to entitlem ent 
under the general sales law. In so doing, a wide m eaning can then be 
attributed to “rectify” which would include the power o f substitution in 
cases involving virtually identical mass produced consum er products but 
only where such rectification can be otherw ise m ade under the C .P .W .L .A .. 
viz. in m inor breach situations where the conum er will not be prejudiced 
bv way o f inability o r significant inconvenience. Indeed, there is authority 
in the Act itself supporting  this interpretive approach. It is not without 
significance that in restricting business buyers o f consum er products to the 
remedies extant under the general sales law, the draftsm an, in section 13, 
utilized the expression “rem edies that would normally be available under the 
law  for breat h o f w arranty” (emphasis added). Similar wording would p re­
sumably have been utilized in section 14(2) to accomplish the same purpose 
if intended, ie. the seller could have l>een restricted to supplying a replace­
m ent if he is normally entitled by law to do so. T h e  notable absence o f th.it 
expression may suggest a d ifferent intention for purposes of section 14(2). 
Such an in terpretation would serve a very desirable C.P .W .L .A . policy of 
enabling both consum ers and sellers to realize m ore consistently their rea­
sonable expectations in the purchase and  sale ol consum er products. T he 
consum er adm ittedly has a reasonable expectation of receiving in good 
working o rd e r the consum er product that forms the subject m atter of his
IIHKridman, \upia . loo tn o te  IH. ai pp
'" ’O ntario SuU\ »/ (,i>ods Rrp<irt. \upia . lot>inotr 1 al pp  M>l-p>.'<
'""Sertion 24 Presum abU su th  a contractual m odification  p erm itlin x  substitution  tor brcat h ot an exp tess  
warrants n ou ld  lx- perm issib lr u nd ri s 25(1) assum m g co m p ilan te  m th  dit* ta u n css  and rcasonablrncss  
to n  t roi.
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contract ra th er than  one which may be identical from  the seller’s subjective 
viewpoint.107 However, it is difficult to see how these reasonable expecta­
tions are prejudiced if the consum er is required  to accept a substitute 
consum er product that is, for all practical purposes, identical from  the 
reasonable bystander’s objective viewpoint.108 This is legislatively reflected 
in the Uniform Sale o f Goods Act form ulation which defines “cure” to include 
the right to substitute “in the case o f a sale o f identified goods, goods which 
differ in no m aterial respect from  those goods."109
d. Time for Cure
An additional uncertainty touching the seller Y right to rectify under 
the C .P .W .L A . concerns the issue ol how much patience the consum er 
must exercise before he can resort with im punity to rejecting the consum er 
product. Stated alternatively, for how long is the seller perm itted to attem pt 
his rectification and , fu rther, is he perm itted m ore than one attem pt in 
which to accomplish it? Section 1 (>( I ) o f the C .P .W .L .A . entitles the con­
sum er to reject within certain time restraints “where the seller . . . does not 
rectify the breach pursuant to am  opportunity that the buver gives him 
under section 14 o r otherwise." But the length o f time which the sellei 
may take to rectify his breach ol warranty is not set out in sec tion 14. What 
is required is simply that the buyer a llo rd  the seller in appropriate  cir­
cumstances a “reasonable opportunity ." 1 he concept ol reasonable o p p o r­
tunity to rectify presum ably includes reasonable lime in^which to ellect 
rectification o f the breach. I his would be in accord with the- Saskatchewan 
provision which merely affords the seller an oppoitunitv  to make good his  
breach “within a reasonable period ol tim e.”1"' However, it is im portant to 
recognize that in the New Brunswick lorm ulation. unlike Saskatchewan's, 
the ou ter param eters ol the concept ol reasonable time .is regards ininoi 
breaches ol w arranty are expressly circum scribed In the sixi\-cla\ rule in 
section 16(1) which imposes a fu rth e r restriction on the consumei in ad ­
dition to rejecting “within a reasonable time altei lie discovers the- breac li. 
T his should be a param ount consideration in am  judic ial attem pt to de ­
lineate the tem poral param eters o f “reasonable opportunity to rectilx in 
New Brunswick.
lu7As noted by an A m en t an court 111 /a tm \k ir  (.hrxTulft h it \ Smith, \uptn . foo tn o te  9 1. .11 |> 20!). in te leten c r 
to the U.C.C. cu re provisions: "It was not the in ten tion  o l th e L egislature that the right to c lire' is .1 lim itless 
on e to be con tro lled  only bv the will o l th e sellei A 'cure' which en d eavou rs bv substitution to ten d et .1 
chattel not w ithin the agreem en t or con tem p lation  o l the parties is invalid " I bus. I01 exam p le . .1 buvei 
is not required to accept a newer and im p roved  version o l the p iod u ci Hartus v R im in h .  2H4 \   ̂ S 2d  
222  (Clitv C l. 1967)
‘“•For an economic analysis ol the cure  and revocation provisions ol Artiele 2 ol the  t ( (  . see Sc hw .ui/. 
"C ure and Kevcxation for CJualitv Delects I he Utility ol Bargains". (1975) lt> H ( Indus i? Com I Hr\ 
543 See also: Priest, "B reach and R em ed\ lo t the  I endet ol Non-C .onloim m g ( »oods I nde t tlie- I n ito im  
Com m ercial C ode An Economic A pproach". ( 197H) 91 H u n  I R n  9t>0
'““Section 7.7( I )(b)
" “Section 20( I )(a) Professor R om ero notes that the Sa.skaUhrwan D m /t H illorigm allv la v o u ie d  the legislative 
policy of certam tv ill setting  a period o l (h im  davs within which the seller had to m ake good  the breach  
H ow ever, he n otes, the ap p toach  was latei ab and on ed  on  account o l "the gteat vai letv ol con sum e! p ioduc is 
which tail w ithin the scop e o l the Act It was th ou gh i thai 111 m am  cases .1 thirty dav |»eiiod  w ould Ik- loo  
long but m oth er  cases it cou ld  l>e to o  short" R om ero, \upra. foo tn o te  56. at p  V24
)
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From a theoretical standpoint a distinction may sometimes he war­
ranted between m ultiple attem pts to rectify the same defect and multiple 
attem pts at rectifying d iffe ren t deficiencies. But, for reasons which follow, 
the distinction is probably insupportable un d er the C .P .W .L .A . remedial 
regime.
Professor Phillips, in reference to the Am erican position has set out 
the argum ent in favour o f  legislatively restricting the seller’s right o f cure 
to a single attem pt at curing the same defect:
A lthough the law has to date shown no tendency toward restricting the 
seller’s right o f  cure to a single attem pt to correct the sam e defect, it would  
seem  desirable to restrict the right in this m anner. T h e  rem edy o f  cure  
serves a very useful and desirable policy in the law by contributing to the 
adjustm ent o f  d isputes, but it is by no m eans an unm ixed blessing. Attem pts 
at cure necessarily involve trouble, inconvenience and exp en se , particularly 
for the buyer who is deprived o f  the goods while repair is being attem pted  
and who can d o  noth ing but sit tight and hope that the results will furnish  
him with an acceptable product rather than with a patchwork com m odity  
that is returned only to give m ore trouble in the future. T h e  buyer can 
always seek further cure if  he desires, and if the seller is willing to attem pt 
it then the law will support their agreem ent. But absent such an agreem ent, 
there seem s to be no good reason why the law should force the buyer to 
negotiate bevond an initial unsuccessful attem pt. Drawing the line at one  
cure attem pt will tend to force the seller to d o  an acceptable job in repairing  
the goods, and perhaps m ore rem otelv it will serve to prod him into putting  
m ore acceptable products on the market in the first place. If he can do  "* 
neither, then it hardly seem s fair to burden the buyer with the seller's 
continued ineptness, and to leave the buyer in the uncertain position of not 
knowing when he is released from  the grip o f  in ep titu d e." 1
But, as later noted by Professor Phillips, although a reading of section 2- 
508 o f the Uniform Commercial Code might lead to the conclusion that the 
seller is only entitled to a single attem pt at curing the same defect,11- the 
American judicial inclination seems to be to allow the seller to make re­
peated a ttem pts.m  A similar in terpretation  within the context o f the 
C .P .W .L .A . could prejudice New Brunswick consum ers on the basis o f the 
limitations imposed by section 16(1) on their rejection rights in the event 
o f non-rectification, viz. the obligation not only to reject within a reasonable 
time after he discovers the breach, but also to discover it within sixtv days 
o f delivery in all cases o f m inor breach. In consequence, the rationale 
suggested by Professor Phillips for restricting the seller to a single attem pt 
at curing the same defect is even m ore compelling in its application to New 
Brunswick.
While d ifferen t theoretical considerations may apply to the question 
o f multiple attem pts to rectify d ifferen t m inor deficiencies, the same prac­
•"Phillips, "Revocation of \u e p t a n c e  and I tit* C onsum er Buver", (1979) 75 C.om I /  354 at p. 358.
11 • I fie v i le r  is perm itted  to m ake "a" con form in g  delivers under s. 2-5(>8( I ) or to substitute "a con form ing  
ten d ei under s. 2-508(2).
Motor Cu h it M rM urtry, supra. footnote* 93 . See also (ifn rra l Motors Corporation \ t.ariirst, liS-4 
S 2d  S I  I (Ala. Sup  Ct. I9f»6) and Annot . 41 A I. H 2d I 173 at pp  1191-1 IVM» ( 11)55).
72 U N  B. LAW JOURNAL •  REVUE DE DROIT U N. B.
tical considerations confront the aggrieved consum er in New Brunswick 
on account o f the aforem entioned restrictions on his ri^ht o f rejection in 
the event o f the seller’s non-rectification. For purposes oi illustration the 
Saskatchewan case o f Woodley v. Alex's Appliances L td .1'4 is helpful. In that 
case the consum er experienced some ten d ifferent m inor problem s with a 
new cooking stove over a one year period. O n each' occasion the problem  
was in tu rn  successfully cured  by the seller. Mr. Justice Gerein o f the District 
C ourt o f  Saskatchewan, in refusing to allow the consum er to reject the 
stove, recognized the seller’s right un d er the Saskatchewan legislation to 
utilize m ultiple attem pts to cure d ifferen t m inor deficiencies. While his 
decision was reveresed by the C ourt o f Appeal on the ground that the 
“congeries o f  defects” am ounted  in the aggregate to a breach o f warranty 
o f a substantial character entitling the consum er to reject, it is nevertheless 
im portant to recognize that in Saskatchewan, unlike New Brunswick, a 
consum er is never perm itted  to reject on the sole basis o f the seller’s u n ­
willingness o r inability to cure a m inor defect. T h e  exclusive basis for 
rejection u n d er the Saskatchewan Act is substantial breach or irrem ediable 
defect. T h e  Act does not impose an arbitrary time restriction on the buyer’s 
right to reject on either ground. For this reason a Saskatchewan consum er, 
unlike his New Brunswick coun terpart, will seldom if ever be prejudiced 
by perm itting the seller to utilize m ultiple attem pts to cure d ifferen t m inor 
deficiencies."5 Nevertheless, in o rd e r to avoid any uncertainty over the 
effect o f delay, it was seen fit to incorporate in the Saskatchewan legislation 
additional express protection for the consum er who delays in reliance upon 
the seller’s assurances o f cure:
T h e consum er shall exercise his right to reject the consum er product . . 
within a reasonable period o f  tim e . . . except where the consum er delavs 
the exercise o f his right to reject because he has relied upon assurances 
m ade bv the party in breach or his agent that the breach will Ik- rem edied  
when in fact the breach is not so rem ed ied .11"
In the event that New Brunswick courts ref use to restrict the seller’s right 
to rectify to a single attem pt to cure the same and/or d ifferent deficiencies, 
an am endm ent to the C .P .W .L .A ., in similar term s, expanding tht* param ­
eters o f the sixty-day limitation and reasonable time would am eliorate most 
consum er concerns and uncertainties.
(tv) Expenses and Damages
Section 14(4) o f the C .P .W .L .A . specifically imposes liability upon the 
seller for all reasonable expenses the buyer incurs in re tu rn ing  the* product, 
at the seller’s request, to the seller or to any repair facility o r service outlet
ll4.Su^ra. foo tn o te  H4
" 'T h e  Saskatchew an consum er in order to subsecpjenilv reject must simplv establish that .iiin d e le d  is noi 
rem ediab le or. alternatively, that the d e lec t or the loialuv o l d ie  d e lec ts  constitu te a breach o l substantial 
character, as lon g  as he re |ecls  w ithin a reasonable j>eriod o l tim e as d efin ed  in section see s 2<*( 11
llhSec tion 20(2) I he sam e result is ac to in p lish ed  bv |udu i.il intei (»relation in the I lined Siaic-s see (.n im ling  
v Haiti. 4M5 S W 2d IH.S (A tk 1972). w here the purchase! o l a truck d elaved  his refection of the vehicle 
for m ore than tw o vears hi reliance u pon  the seller's assurances that repairs cou ld  In- made-
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that is operated  o r authorized by the seller. T he  question arises as to what 
effect a successful cure has on any claim the consum er may have for dam ­
ages sustained before the cure, the expense incurred  by the rental o f  a 
substitute consum er product, for example.
T he general provision for dam ages in section 15 o f the Act is arguably 
broad enough to com pensate for this type o f loss on the ground that it was 
incurred while the seller was in breach o f a warranty. O n the o ther hand, 
the section is equally broad enough to com pensate the consum er on the 
same basis for any reasonable expenses incurred in re tu rn ing  the consum er 
product to the seller for rectification. Yet, as noted above, the draftsm an 
apparently felt the need to insert a specific provision to affix financial 
responsibility upon the seller. This potential problem  was similarly iden­
tified in respect o f the Ontario Draft Sales R ill1,7 and led to the insertion of 
a specific provision in the Uniform Sale of Goods Act to recognize that a buyer 
may still have an action for dam ages against a seller who has successfully 
cu red .118 T h e  Saskatchewan Act also avoids the problem  by specifically 
providing that “the consum er shall be entitled to recover dam ages for losses 
that he has suffered and that were reasonably foreseeable as liable to result 
from the breach regardless of w hether the breach is rem edied.”11"
C. BUYER'S R IG H T  TO R E JEC T TH E C O N SU M E R  P R O D U C T  
(i) General
T he First Report of the Consumer Protection Project suggested three major 
reasons why the right of rejection ra th er than dam ages should be the 
cornerstone in a new rem edial regime.
. . .  In (Ik- first place, the dam ages may not am ount to enou gh  to make it 
worthwhile for (the buyer) to take legal action. I he pow er to cancel the 
transaction puts the buyer in a better position to com pel proper perlorm - 
ance himself without the aid of legal process. Secondly, the dam ages mas 
Ik- uncertain. For exam ple, reasonable m en can easily d iffer  over “the dif- 
ference between the value of the goods at the tim e of delivers to the buver 
and the value they would have had it they had answered to the warranty", 
which is the prxma facie rule for recovers lor  breach ol warrants of qualitv.
1 hirdly, and in anv event, the consum er buys goods for use. What he wants 
in the goods he contracted to receive, not som ething else vvitli a monetars 
adjustm ent. T o  get what he wants he mas have to resell these goods and 
buy the proper ones. But consum ers as a rule are not in a vers good position  
to dispose of goods at their Ih*si price. Sellers who are dealers are in a better 
position to sell the goods lor their l>est price .12"
T he C.P.W .L.A. form ulation of the consum er’s right to reject is one of the 
most obvious applications of its fidem haheat emptor orientation; the level of
11 See H m lge \  H iu k le s. \uf>ta. loo t note 50, .11 |> I V* See also I m in im  l..m  ( .o n te ie m e  of C anada.
I inform Law Sri lion Hr pot I on S air of (,< hhL  ( I'.IH'Ji .11 |> I 12
""SciUon 7(4).
" ‘‘Section 20< I Hall ill
" S i i fn n .  I imMIKHc I V  .11 |>|> I I l - l  I S1m1l.11 i l l l e i o l s  h a v e  I t e e l i  1<I<1111I1<<I w 11 t i n  1 i l i t  l i m . t d t i  t o n l e s l  o l  
-■ales s e e  O utturn  \ttli » /  <,<««/< /{i ju n t  u ifn a .  l o o t n o U  I .it |> I V 1
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confidence instilled by this rem edy should be high, indeed. Simply stated, 
the consum er can expect the product, in its original or rectified form , to 
m easure u p  to what has been said, w ritten o r advertised about it and to 
meet reasonable quality and fitness expectations or, subject to time re­
straints, he can reject the product and  get his money back with o r without 
a deduction for interim  use.
(it) Grounds f  or Rejection
T h e consum er’s right to reject is set out in section 16 o f the C .P .W .L .A .:
lb ( l )  W here the seller is in breach o f  a warranty provided by this Act and  
does not rectify the breach pursuant to any opportunity that the buyer gives 
him under section 14 or otherw ise, the buyer mav reject the product if  he 
does so within a reasonable tim e after he discovers the breach and he d is­
covers the breach not later than sixtv days after delivery o f  the product.
16(2) N otw ithstanding that the buver discovers the breat h later than sixtv 
davs after delivery of the product, w here the breach is a major breach tlie 
buver may reject the product if he does so within a reasonable tim e after 
he ought to have discovered the breach.
It is im portant to reiterate that section 14 o f the Act does not require the 
buyer to provide the seller with a reasonable opportunity  to rectify in all 
non-m ajor breach cases. As noted earlier, w here he is unable to do so o r 
unable to do so without significant inconvenience, the buyer is relieved of 
this obligation. As a result, there  are  really th ree identifiable grounds jus­
tifying the consum er’s right to reject: (1) a m ajor breach of warranty by 
the seller, (2) a failure by the seller to rectify after being given an o p p o r­
tunity u n d er section 14 o r otherw ise to do  so, and (3) any breach o f warranty 
by the seller which is accom panied by the buyer’s inability o r inability 
w ithout significant inconvenience to afford  a reasonable opportun ity  to 
rectify.
a. M a jo r B reach
In providing New Brunswick consum ers with an im mediate right <>l 
rejection lot major, as opposed to m inor, breathes of warranty, the 
C .P .W .L .A . is consonant with the universal trend  of reform  proposals and 
legislation.1-1 However stvled, and w liether defined or undefined, the thrust 
of these form ulations has been the creation of a unitary warranty scheme 
perm itting exam ination of both the nature of the breach and its conse­
quences in determ ining w hether o r not the breach is of sufficient severity 
to justify rejection. Particular problem s occasioned In New Brunswick s 
failure to define “m ajor breac h and the inaugural paucity of judit lal tl.u - 
ification were earlier canvassed in reference to the seller s right to rectify. 
Of course, am  attem pted definitional o r judicial clarification could only be 
of m arginal assistance in resolving the very difficult question fating  an 
aggrieved buyer in U nd erlin e  cases, viz. w hether or not the seller’s breat I) 
of warranty is really a majoi b reath  enabling the buve* u> im nrdiatelv
m See d iscu ssion  \upru. fo o tn o tes  KI-9H
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reject. T h e  buyer’s best course of action in all but the most obvious cases 
is to give the seller the benefit o f the doubt and allow him a reasonable 
opportunity  to rectif y his breach of warranty. If this initially tilts the balance 
in such situations tow ards the seller, the consum er will not ultimately be 
prejudiced due to his broad right to reject in all cases o f non-rectification. 
T he flexibility inherent in the C .P .W .L .A . m ajor breach concept creates, to 
this extent at least, an overlap between the rights o f rejection and cure. 
But this overlap has the salutory ef fect of saving the contract in many cases 
and thus avoiding economic waste.
b. Seller's Failure to Rectify
A distinguishing feature o f the C .P .W .L .A . is its provision o f a general 
right to reject the consum er product if the seller fails to rectify it in ac­
cordance with any opportunity  provided This diffe entiates the New 
Brunswick legislation from  the Saskatchewan Act, for exam ple, which does 
not recognize the consum er’s right to reject where the seller fails to make 
good a m inor breach of w arranty unless the breach is actually irrem ediable. 
If the breach can be rem edied, albeit not by o r through the seller, the 
consum er is only entitled to have the breach rem edied elsewhere and, in 
any event, is restricted to dam ages.122 T h e  New Brunswick form ulation, in 
conferring a right to reject in all cases o f non-rectification, provides the 
ultimate incentive for the seller to ef fect cure. It recognizes that in consum er 
transactions, the consum er will rarely be in a better position to c ure than 
the seller. Even then, the Uniform Sale of Goods Act follows the New B runs­
wick precedent and applies it in the broader context o f general sales.12'
O ne additional aspect relating to the time fram ework o f the seller’s 
failure to rectify is worthy o f special note. W here section 14 confers upon 
the seller a statutory right to rectify, the buyer is required  to provide him 
with a “reasonable opportun ity” to do so. A lthough the buyer is not re­
quired to provide the seller with any opportun ity  to rectify where an ex­
ception to section 14 is applicable, lie may, nevertheless, choose to do so. 
For exam ple, a consum er may elect to treat the seller’s m ajor breach as 
m inor and provide him with an opportun ity  to rectify. In these circum ­
stances there  appears to be no requirem ent that the opportunity  so p ro ­
vided Ik* a “reasonable opportun ity .” T he  notable absence of the word 
"reasonable” in section 1(> suggests that the buyer’s right to reject on the 
basis of non-rectification arises on the seller’s failure to rectify pursuant to 
(1) any reasonable opportun ity  that the buyer gives him as required  In­
sertion 14, and (2) any opportunity , reasonable o r unreasonable, that the 
buyer otherwise provides. This is hardly prejudicial to the seller insofar as 
he has no general right to rectify o ther than u nder the Act. If the buyer
'•'•Section L’Oi I h.i i See also R om ero. supra. foo tn o te  "it», at p 323
m  1 he  Ac t h.isi< alls p ro v id e s  th a t th e  b u v er has a i ight to  re |e i  t foi a m  n o n c o n to r  i n n \ . w h e th e r  su b stan tia l 
or o th e rw ise . sub |ec t to  th e  se lle r 's  r ig h t to  c u re  s 7 7 ( f  O ntario D raft Sale\ Hill w hu h . th ro u g h  p ro \is io iis  
en a b lin g  th e  b u \e i  to  d e m a n d  th e  c u ie  of in in o t b rea c h e s  a n d  ru in in g  th e se  in to  su b stan tia l h ie a ih e s  
w h e re  th e  seller ta ils to  c u re , ac co m p lish es  so m ew h at th e  sam e th in g  allx-it b \ a m o re  c u m h e rso m e  ro u te  
see ss. 7 7 (4 1 a n d  7.7(5)
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affords a gratuitous opportun ity  to rectify in circum stances w here he has 
an im m ediate right to reject, he should certainly be able to unilaterally set 
the param eters o f the opportun ity  provided.
c. Buyer's Exemption From Rectification
Section 14 o f the C .P .W .L .A . exem pts the buyer from having to provide 
the seller with a reasonable opportun ity  to rectify where the buyer is unable 
to do so o r unable to do  so without significant inconvenience. In the form er 
case, where the inability is attributable to the buyer’s use or to dam age 
independent o f the seller’s breach, section 17(3) provides as follows:
17(3) W here before rejection the product has deteriorated to a state beyond  
that attributable to reasonable wear and tear for the period o f  tim e that the 
product was used by the buyer, or has been dam aged by causes that are not 
attributable to the seller’s breach, the seller mav deduct from  the refund of 
anv paym ents on the price or recover from  the buver, or both, an am ount 
for com pensation for the d ifference  between the value of the product as it 
is and the value that it would have but for that deterioration or dam age.
In providing this answer to the question o f what ef fec t the buyer’s inability 
to re tu rn  the consum er product in specie should have, section 17(3) sub­
stantially departs from  the general sales law by negating the com m on law 
restitutio in integrum prerequisite to resc ission and providing the opportunity  
for judicial uniform ity in the application of m onetary allowance adjust­
ments. I bis represents ano ther clear legislative assertion o f the primacv ot 
the ('..P.W .L.A.'s consum er rejection rem edy .124
(Hi) l  ime for Rejection
a. R easonable T im e a n d  The fr() Day R u le
T he C .P .W .L .A . imposes a time fram ew ork within which the aggrieved 
consum er must exercise his rejection rights. Section 16 distinguishes be­
tween rejection t ights exercised on the basis of non-rec tification of a m inor 
breach of w arranty and rejec tion rights exercised on the basis of a major 
breach. In the form er case the consum er can only reject the product if (I) 
he rejects within a reasonable time after he discovers the breach and (2) 
he discovers the breac h not later than sixty days after delivery o f the p ro d ­
uct. In the latter case the consum er must similarly rejec t within a reasonable 
period of time after he discovers the breach but, if that initial discoverx 
occurs outside tfie 60 day period, the consum er can still reject as long as 
he does so within a reasonable time after he ought to have discovered it.
These provisions incorporate the recom m endations of the First Report 
of the Consumer Protection Project'2 ' and, in so doing, represent the ( .P. W I A. 
resolution to the "acceptance" and "passing of p roperty” problem s inherent 
in the rescission rem edy under the Sale of Goods Act.'-" I his resolution, it
le tlev  .iih) B u d g e . (o n s u m e i Product W arrants and Iial>ilit\ \» t, I'tTH (l ' . l79 | 1 l ‘u»l I ml> Ini 
Hit), w lie icm  the authors o p in e  that the basic < I ’ VI / ,t icm ech  is dam ages
l?s.Su fna . footnote IS. at p I2H
'-"’See d iscu ss io n , wifna , aliove too l n o te s  |
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should be noted, goes much fu rth e r than simply abolishing the passing o f 
property  test and m aking deem ed acceptance in the S.G .A. subject to the 
buyer’s reasonable opportunity  for exam ination.127 Instead, it imposes, al­
beit on an arbitrary  basis, a definite time period for rejection in m inor 
breach situations and provides a contingent extension o f that time period 
in the case o f m ajor breaches o f warranty. T he  policy choice inherent in 
this legislative form ulation gives recognition to the fact that if rejection 
occurs early, the relatively small degree o f prejudice suf fered by the seller 
is outw eighed by the im portance o f providing the consum er with an 
uncom plicated128 and effective remedy. Alternatively, the longer it takes 
the consum er to reject, the m ore likely the seller12'' will be prejudiced by 
the re tu rn  o f the consum er product and the greater need, therefore , to 
restrict rejection to very serious latent defects which were reasonably dis­
covered.1'’0
While the C .P .W .L .A . form ulation achieves the objective o f elim inating, 
o r at least am eliorating, much o f the uncertainty that would otherw ise attach 
to the issue o f what constitutes acceptance, it also raises a new area of 
difficulty, viz. the determ ination of what constitutes rejection “within a 
reasonable time" afte r discovery of the breach. T he C .P .W .L .A . does not 
define the concept o f  reasonable time. T h e  Saskatchewan Act, however, 
which also requires that a buyer who is entitled to reject do  so within a 
reasonable period o f tim e,1 Sl has clarified the m eaning of that requirem ent 
in the following term s:
. . .  a reasonable period of tim e shall run from  the tim e of delivery of the 
product to the consum er and shall consist of a period of tim e sufficient to 
permit such testing, trial or exam ination of the consum er product as mav 
Ik* norm ally required by consum ers o f  that product and as may be appro­
priate considering the nature of the product, for the purpose o f  determ in ing  
the conform ity of the product to the obligations im posed under this Ac t on  
the party in breach.
This statutory clarification also itemizes relevant considerations for New 
Brunswick purposes, providing the C. P .W .L .A . distinction between patent 
and latent defects and  the role of exam ination and trial use are kept iti 
m ind.
li7See text accom panying footnote  22.
l2"Com pare. from  the stand p oin t of certainty, section  8.2(2)(d ) of th e  I 'm fo rm  Salr  <</ (»/«*/a Art which  
provides that the buyer loses fits tigh t to reject w here the- n onconform ity is of a m in or character and a 
substantial p*nt«l lias elapsed  after delivery  (em phasis added).
'^ N or is prejud ice in th ese c ire um stances exc lusive to  the sellet As n oted  by Professed R om ero, the lon ger  
the con sum er retains the con su m er p roduct, (he m ore d ifficult it will l>e for him  to p rove that (he product 
was d efective  ai (fie- tim e of sale- See R om ero, suftia. footn ote 5<i. ai p. 1V2‘) Sec- also Phillips, \u fna . font note
111,a t p S96
lv,A policy o f  w aiver of rights bv the con sum er seem s to u nd erlie  the ('. I ’ W /  .-V treatm ent of major latent 
defects, le. a con su m er should  not he able to sit on  his rights to (lie possib le it not probable detrim en t of 
the seller w hen he cou ld , by the exercise  of reasonable d iligen ce, have d iscovered  the d efect and rejected  
the con su m er product at a significantly earlier tim e
1,1 Sec t ion  20(2)
l,2Section 20(3).
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b. Examination and Trial Use
Exam ination and trial use will usually bring to light patent defects. In 
a sense the C .P .W .L .A . requires that it be carried out within 60 days o f 
delivery o r else the consum er is restricted to an action for damages. During 
this 60 day period, however, the consum er need only be concerned with 
“reasonable tim e” beginning to run  from  the point o f actual discovery.,!W 
T he C.P. W .L.A. treatm ent o f latent def ects, on the o ther hand, distinguishes 
on the basis o f the quality o f the breach. Latent defects constituting a m inor 
breach o f w arranty are treated  exactly the same way as patent defects and 
are subject, as a result, to the 60 day rule. But latent defects which rise to 
the level o f a m ajor breach may entitle the consum er to reject, notwith­
standing the 60 day rule, providing he does so within a reasonable time 
after he ought to have discovered the breach. T he net effect, therefore, is 
that “reasonable tim e” in relation to rejection based on latent m ajor defects 
will run  from  the time o i actual discovery within the 60 day period following 
delivery o f the consum er product and from  the time o f  constructive discovery 
thereafter.
A difficult and related problem  posing relevant tem poral dim ensions 
will involve distinguishing between the discovery o f defect(s) and the dis­
covery o f the fact that the defect o r a com bination o f defects rise(s) to the 
level o f  a m ajor breach. In this respect the American experience is revealing. 
Section 2-608 of the Uniform Commercial (lode, as noted earlier, perm its the 
buver to reject goods even after acceptance on grounds analogous to major 
breach providing his revocation of acceptance occurs “within a reasonable 
time after he discovers or should have discovered the grounds for it.”1”  
American courts, in applying the provisions, seem often to have given the 
benefit o f doubt to the buyer.,ss
In sum m ary, if the consum er is to preserve lus rejection rights undei 
the C.P .W .L .A . tlie length of permissible exam ination or trial use periods 
will vary depend ing  upon w hether tlie defect is patent oi latent, and. it 
latent, w hether the defect am ounts to a m ajor breat h of warranty.
c. Effect of Third Party Interests
T he general rule in section 21(1) provides that the consum er is not 
entitled to reject the consum er product if he is unable to give it back to
'" O f cou rse, it the con sum er product in used and the Inner exam in ed  the product priot to  sale o i su p p l\. 
the seller is not liable tor detec ts whic h the tv|»e of exam ination  m ade h\ the buver ought to have revealed  
s. 10(2)(c). to t  a full d iscussion  on  the effect of exam inations under the ( ,1 ‘ W I. A  see I'ait I. \upra. 
footn ote 1, at pp  172-177.
1,41 he I '  provisions are arguahlv m ore v igou rou s than their (. I‘ W .L .A  counterparts m sof.u as the  
revocation must not onlv be e ffec ted  w ithin the perm issib le tim e fram e but must also oc<ui liefoie- "am  
substantial ch an ge m con d ition  of the good s which is not caused  b\ th en  ow n d e fe c t s ’ s 2-(><)K(2).
'" S ee , for exam p le . Tigrr M otor Company v M cM u tlr \. \upra. footn ote 93  (acceptance revoked a ftci II 
m onths and SO unsu ccessfu l attem pts). Fablok M itts. Ini \ ( .m lu t M a ih in t C5 L oun tln  C.o., !U 0 A .2d I'M 
(N | Sujiet 1973) [tw o vears a reasonable tim e to  revoke accep tan ce of knitting m a ih m e|;  Dopiernllu \ 
Arkanuis t.ouisunui (ias C.o.. 4 9 9  S W  2d *'»10 (A ik  Snpt C.t 1973) [40 m onths a reasonable tim e to  tevok e  
acceptance of an a ir-con dition in g  unit) C f Point H rjngrrution S m u r \  L td  \ M oltienhaun , \u fna . footn ote
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the seller free from  any right against it in favour o f a th ird  party. This 
covers the obvious case o f resale by the consum er and, it resolves in the 
seller’s favour any doubt in the less obvious or unusual cases. T hus, for 
example, du ring  the currency o f a valid w orkm an’s lien against the con­
sum er product o r a valid writ o f fieri facias filed against him, the consum er 
would be disentitled from  rejection. T h e  m ajor exception to the general 
rule occurs where the consum er gran ts a security interest to a th ird  party. 
This will not preclude rejection unless the am ount secured by the security 
interest exceeds the am ount the buyer may recover.1̂
(tv ) Notice o f Rejection
While the C .P .W .L .A . does require that the consum er exercise his re­
jection rights prom ptly, it is silent as to the formalities o f rejection and 
merely provides that the rejection is not effective until the seller receives 
actual o r constructive notice that the consum er does not accept the p rod ­
uct.1,6 A question arises as to what ex ten t the consum er is required  to give 
reasons for his rejection.
At com m on law the aggrieved buyer is perm itted to rescind his contract 
with insufficient o r no reasons provided there existed at fhe time sufficient 
grounds to justify rescission.1,7 This can be com pared with the position 
under the Uniform Commercial Code which imposes a duty on the buyer to 
particularize his grounds o f rejection. Section 2-605 (1) provides in part:
2-605.(1) T h e buyer's f ailure to state in connection with rejection a particular 
defect which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection precludes him from  
relying on the unstated defect to justify rejection or to establish breach
(a) where the seller could  have cured it if stated seasonably;
This legislative form ulation recognizes that where an unstated defect is 
curable, failure to note that defect when rejecting can seriously prejudice 
the seller’s right to ef fect cure. This rationale is equally appropriate  to the 
seller’s statutory right to rectify as conferred  under the C.P .W .L .A . A seller 
obviously cannot rectify effectively if he is wholly uninform ed as to the 
cause o f the trouble. It is subm itted that if the seller’s right to rectify is to 
reHect the reasonable expectations o f  the parties and  to constitute an ef­
fective C.P .W .L .A . counterbalance to the buyer’s right to reject, the buyer
Section 20 . as am. A ccord ing  to the draftsm an th e rationale for tins excep tion  is that the securttv 
interest can be d isth arged  with the m onev d u e from  the supplier, and to this end  s. 20 (2 ) per nuts the 
seller to pav o ff the third party with that m onev: see D ore. " I he C onsum er Produtt W arrants and  Liability 
Act". (19H2) SI U .N .B .L .J . IH1 at p. 109. In this case there will lie n o  liability for the tost of borrow ing  
beyond  what has accrued u p  to that tim e. For oth er  m in or excep tion s to the general rule, see s. 21(2), as 
am .
'“ Section IH(.S).
1,7“| l t |  is d ea r  . . that [parties) are not. by their rejection  of the ten d er on  an insuihc tent grou n d , p m  luded  
from  su p p ortin g  the rejection on  oth er  an d  valid grounds": per M cCardie |. in M aubrr Sacchannr (.o  v 
Com P nx iuds Co., 11919) I K B. 198 at p. 204 . as q u o ted  in Ontario Salr of ( ¡oods Report, \uprn. foo tn o te  13. 
at p  47H See alv> H nti\h  id  Rrr»ngton\ /  u i \ Xorth W 'e\trm  C.arh/ir Irn  Co . j I92H) A ( 4M ( H I I.
should be required  to p- ovide the seller with reasonable inform ation in the 
circum stances regarding the problem  to be rectified o r his g rounds for 
rejection. This result could be accom plished by am endm ent o r judicial 
in terpretation. Both the Ontario D raft Sales B ill1,8 and. with modification, 
the Uniform Sale of Goods A c t1™ contain provisions com parable to U.C.C. 2- 
605( 1 )(a). These would serve as useful precedents for legislative resolution 
in New Brunswick. Alternatively, the same result could be accomplished if 
New Brunswick courts were willing to impose such a duty of disclosure 
upon the buyer within the param eters of his obligation to provide the seller 
with a “reasonable opportun ity  to rectify.” T he  elasticity o f those param ­
eters could and should recognize all relevant factors including reasonable 
disclosure o f defects and symptoms, within the knowledge of the consum er 
and his willingness to co-operate in any attem pt by the seller to rectify, 
itself including, where appropria te , the provision o f additional inform ation 
on request.
(v) Consequences of Rejection
a. Buyer's D uties U pon  Rejection
U nder the general sales law a buyer is un d er no duty to re tu rn  rejected 
goods to the seller; it suffices if he simply notifies the seller that he rejects 
them  and places them  at the seller’s disposal.14" T h e  First Report recom ­
m ended no change in this principle for New Brunswick’s consum er leg­
islation.141 the C .P .W .L .A ., however, departs from  this recom m endation 
and, although not requiring the consum er in all cases to re tu rn  the con­
sum er product upon rejection to the seller,142 requires him to do so at the 
seller’s request. In such cases the requirem ent imposed by section 22(2) is 
to re tu rn  the rejected product to the seller o r to any repair facility o r service 
outlet that is operated  o r authorized bv the seller unless: (1) the consum er 
would lie significantly inconvenienced in re tu rn ing  i t ," ' o r (2) the consum er 
has not received, in accordance with section 18, a refund  from  the seller
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‘'"Sei tion M r>( 11
l,,JSet tu in H *>< I ) ni tlu- I 'ntform Sole n/ i .<**/> \ i  I onlv ptec hides .1 buver from  reiving <>n the  unstated  d e lf t 1 
to |ustifv rejection 1 his reflects the  to lu e n i  that the  words "or to establish b re a th ’ in the  O ntario  fo r­
m ulation tnight lie given a broad m eaning so as to encom pass all claims lo t dam ages see l in torn i I .aw 
C onference o t C anada. In ifo rm  l.au Srrtw n H fporl on Sa tf of Goods ( IM82). at p. 165. I he I inform  At t also 
contains an added  provision that precludes the seller's failure to partii u la ri/e  the seller's non ton to rm ilv  
unless the  sellei is "untlulv p re lud ite li"  s e e s  Mt>(3i
l4"See tltst ussitin. supni. afxive footnote ‘20
141 .S t ifrru. loo t note 13. at pp 136-137. 1 be Saskatchew an \ i t  lullv im p lem en ted  a sim ilar recom m en dation  
anti m erelv provides that w here a con sum er product is r e |e tted . "the to n su m et shall have n o responsibilitv  
to deliver th e prod uc t to th e partv in breat h and  it is su l lit lent il the t on su m er in form s the part\ 111 In eat h 
that he re)ects it": s 23(b).
I4-’ I he  g e n e ra l re q u ire m e n t is m ere lv  tha t th e  bu v er allow th e  sellei to  tak e  bat k th e  im m il l ic i  p io tili«  1 
s 22« 11 ( I s .22 Sask Act
,4 ,|ust as the buvet is excu sed  on the gou n d s of s ig illili ant 1111 o n v e n if  nee |s  I4 (3 )| from  having to return  
the to n su m e i pi ixiut t tijxui 1 eq u esi to a fford  the sellei a reasonable op |x irtum tv  to ret li tv . he is smularlv 
excu sed  ii|x>n rejection  from  retu rn ing  the co n su m ei p tix lu tt  at the request o l the sellt-i anti the exclusive  
ttin sitleralions of to n v e m c n te  are id en tu a l s 22(2)
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of paym ents m ade.144 T h e  rationale behind this change appears to recognize 
that insofar as recaption by the seller is concerned, in consum er sales145 it 
is often the buyer who is in a better position to arrange for re tu rn  o f the 
product. In such cases, it is argued , the seller should be perm itted  to require 
re tu rn  as long as the requisition is without prejudice to the consum er. T he  
C.P .W .L .A . safeguards in that respect include, in addition to the significant 
inconvenience and buyer’s lien exceptions already noted, express provision 
for passing along to the seller all reasonable expenses that the consum er 
incurs in effecting re tu rn  at the seller’s request.146
T h e  consum er is fu rth e r required , by section 22(4), to take reasonable 
care o f the rejected consum er product until he either (1) allows the seller 
to take it back, o r (2) re tu rns the product in accordance with the seller’s 
request. This form ulation raises two potential problem s which could have 
been expressly resolved. T h e  first problem  concerns how long the buyer 
must wait after he’s notified the seller that he has rejected the consum er 
product before it can be said that he has “allow[ed] the seller to take it 
back.” Is notification with the arbitrary  imposition o f a time fram e sufficient 
to thereafter exonerate the buyer for a failure to take reasonable care o f 
the rejected product, o r is a reasonable time fram e implied? T he  Uniform  
Commercial Code, in a precedent followed in both the Ontario Draft Sales 
B ill147 and  the Uniform Sale o f Goods A ct,'4* resolves this problem  by codifying 
the com m on law position and specifically providing that the buyer is obliged 
to hold the goods with reasonable care “for a time sufficient to perm it the 
seller to remove them .” T h e  second problem  concerns the ultim ate re ­
sponsibility for the buyer’s incidental expenses necessitated by this obli­
gation to take reasonable interim  care o f the rejected consum er product. 
Again the U .C .C ., in a precedent similarly followed,149 expressly imposes 
financial liability upon the seller for the buyer’s reasonably incurred  ex­
penses. 150
b. Huyer’s Right In Recover Payments and/or Damages
U nder the general sales law the prerequisite o f a total failure o f con­
sideration disentitles a buyer from  recovering the pruchase price once he 
has received any benefit un d er the con tract.151 T he  First Report o f the Con­
m See d iscussion , infra. o n  h uyer’s lien , above foo tn o tes  156-164.
I4H nlike com m ercia l sales, tor exam p le , w here th e huver can generallv place the rejected good s at the 
sellet *s d isp osal th rou gh ou t norm al business hours. < m sum er sales w ould muc h less frequently a fiord  this 
opportun ity .
'♦’’Sec tion  22(3).
“ ’Section  8.2(2)(b).
MMS«-c n on  8.3(b)
l4l<See s. 9  13 of the Ontario D raft Sales Hill and s. 9  14 of the ( nifiirm Sa if <>f (•txtd.s Act
|s<'Sec n on  2-7 I 1(3). It shou ld  be noted  that eac h of the Acts also p rovid es that the buyer’s "security interest"  
(buyer’s lien) in clud es th ese ex p en ses  m addition  to anv p aym en ts on  price
141Ockenden v Hrnley (1858) K B &- K. 485 . 492  See also section  56(2) S.G  A . w hich provides that "N othing  
m this Act shall affect th e right of the buyer to recover m on ey paid w here the con sid eration  for the 
paym ent of it has tailed."
sumer Protection Project, following the precedent o f the Ontario Warranties 
Report, 152 recom m ended that upon rejection the consum er should be en ­
titled to (1) a refund  o f the purchase price subject to an allowance for the 
benefits received, and (2) any o ther dam age which he may have suffered, 
subject to the usual tests o f foreseeability.153 T hese recom m endations, re ­
flecting a universal trend  in reform  proposals and legislation,154 were in­
corporated  without modification in the C .P .W .L .A .'hb
It should also be noted at this ju n c tu re  that the C .P .W  .L.A. takes cog­
nizance o f potential re fund  problem s that arise w here the buyer’s consid­
eration has included a trade-in. Section 19(2) specifically provides that in 
such circum stances the seller o r the buyer may elect to treat the trade-in 
as if it were money, the am ount o f  which is “deem ed to be the m onetary 
value o f such consideration at the time it was given.” T h e  deem ing provision 
recognizes and resolves the practical difficulties that would otherwise arise 
given existing consum er sales techniques which often inHate or deflate 
trade-in m onetary values in direct p roportion to inflated o r deflated retail 
selling prices.
c. Buyer's Lieu Rights
U nder the general sales law the buyer who rightfully rejects goods has 
no right to hold on to them  as security for repaym ent o f purchase monies 
or for o ther dam ages. As noted in the First Report, this legal requirem ent 
o f having to give back the goods before being entitled to any refund  op­
erates as a powerful practical d eterren t to the exercise o f consum er rejection 
righ ts.156 I he Report recom m ended, therefore, that the New Brunswick 
consum er should have a lien for “any portion o f paym ents m ade on account 
o f the purchase price that he is entitled to recover.”157 Noting the dif ficulty 
of estim ating various unliquidated claims,158 the Report went on to expressly 
recom m end against any lien for general dam ages. T h e  C .P .W .L .A .,XW like
Supra, footnote* 13. ai p. 4b  
" ’Firs/ Report, supra, foo tn o te  IS, at pp. 134-135.
''’’See. for exam p le , the Saskatchew an Act: ss. 20(l)d>) and  23(c); O ntario R fport on Sa if of (¡oods, supra. 
footn ote 13, at p. 516; O ntario D raft Saifs Hill ss 9 .12 -9 .14 ; I ’m /orm  Sa if of (,oods A d  ss 9  13-9.15. ( f  
V S .W W orking Puprr on Sale of (roods, supra, fo o tn o te  52, at para. 13.39.
‘" S e e  sections 15, 17(2), and |K (I)
IV\Su fna , foo tn o te  13. at p. 1 12.
'" Ib id  . at p 132
"* I he fo llow ing quotation  from  R a i f t  v W fbstri ( I85h). 3 Iowa 502  at p 5 12  was c lied  in the hirst Rrport, 
at pp  131-132. to sup|>ort its reluctance to ex ten d  th e  buyer's lien to en com p ass a gen eral claim  fo i 
unliquidated d am ages
l o  give a party the right to d em an d  p aym ent or sec u iit \ fo i the- claim  he niav hold  against another. 
piesup[>oses alm ost necessarily , that lus claim  o i d em an d  is e ith e i in fact ascertained and sc-ttIc-cl. o i 
that it mav lie ap prox im ated  at least. bv fixing a value on th ose th ings, or th ose s e n ic e s . w inch in 
every com m u n ity , have som e estim ated  or m arketable worth U se . on  what basis w ould  he p roceed  
in d em an d in g  paym ent or secu rity ' Or if paym ent o i security should  t>e o ffere d , for what a m ou n t' 
Bv w hom  or how . is th e am ou nt to Ik- a scerta in ed - It the d efen d an t is w illing to com ply , w here is 
the data from  wine h the com p u tation  is to In- made--
IV4See don  IX' I )
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the Saskatchewan Act,160 adopts this reasoning in its entirety and so restricts 
the buyer’s lien to security for the re tu rn  o f the purchase price. T h e  lien 
rights conferred  by the Uniform Commercial Code were cited in the First Report 
as a precedent for its recom m endation.161 T h e  U.C.C. lien rights, however, 
are much b roader and include, in addition to paym ents on price, a num ber 
o f unliquidated claims against the seller, viz. expenses reasonably incurred 
in the inspection, receipt, transportation , care and custody o f the goods.162 
T he  incorporation o f unliquidated claims to this degree appears to have 
presented little difficulty to date in the U nited States. Both the Ontario Draft 
Sales Bill and the Uniform Sale o f Goods Act follow the broader U.C.C. prec­
ed en t,161 even to the extent o f  entitling the buyer not only to retain pos­
session o f the goods but also, in due course, to resell them.
T he O ntario  Law Reform Commission, notw ithstanding its recom ­
m endation to follow the U.C.C. precedent, expressed some doubt con­
cerning the practical im portance o f the buyer’s lien rights in consum er
sales:
. . .  It may well be o f  value to  a m erchant buyer who has storage facilities, 
who knows his rights, and knows where to find a market to enforce his lien  
if this becom es necessary. It seem s less likely that a non-m erchant buyer 
would often  avail h im self o f  the lien right: consum ers as a group are usually 
only too happy to return to the seller goods that have proved unsatisfactory. 
H owever, it is generally agreed that the law should be evenhanded in co n ­
ferring lien rights on buyers and sellers, and it seem s equally reasonable to 
expect that the conferral of the buyer’s lien right should not depend  on the  
frequency with which this right is likely to be invoked by the buyer.,M
hi this respect it is im portant to recognize that in the exercise o f  his 
C.P .W .L .A . buyer’s lien, the consum er is never looking toward ultim ate 
resale o f the consum er product. Resale, if any, will be the seller’s respon­
sibility, and therefore the main advantage o f the C .P .W .L .A . buyer’s lien is 
the effective inducem ent it provides for the seller to prom ptly refund  the 
consum er’s payments. For this reason its efficacy should not be m easured 
bv the frequency with which the lien is invoked by New Brunswick con­
sum ers but, ra ther, by the frequency with which it does not have to be 
invoked.
(I. Deduction for Benefits, Damage and Deterioration
U nder the general sales law a buyer who retains goods for m ore than 
a short period o f time may be held to have accepted them  and consequently 
restricted to a claim for dam ages.I6S T h e  Sale o f Goods Act makes no provision
'•’‘•Section 23(d).
"''Supra , itx><note 159. I he I pre< t*tl«*rn was also followed in Saskatc hewan: see Romero, supra, footnote*
56, at p. 329.
“ Section  2-71 1(3) I he l.aw R eform  C om m ission  o f  N ew  South  W ales recom m en d ed , albeit in the wider 
< on text of general as o p p o sed  to (o n su m er  sales, that the buyer should  have a lien on  go o d s to U m  extent: 
'.ee W orking Paper on Sate of ( ’•ottds, supra. toot note 52 . at para 13.39(g).
lh\Sti^ri<, footnote  149.
""•Ontario Saif of <ittods Rrpvrt. supra, fo o tn o te  13. at p 482.
'•’’’See discussion, supra. above footnotes 13-19
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for any restitutionary claim by the seller for benefits received by the buyer 
during  what the d raftsm an  must have contem plated would be the relatively 
short period betw een delivery and  rejection. While this time period in 
appropriate circum stances has been protracted  by judicial reaction to the 
complexities o f tw entieth century m erchandising,166 the C .P .W .L A . p ro ­
visions on rejection and  cure have extended it to unim agined lengths and 
frequency o f occurrence. By expanding  the permissible grounds and time 
fram e for rejection, the C .P .W .L A . makes it far m ore likely that, p rio r to 
rejection, the consum er will have derived some benefit from  the rejected 
consum er product, and  the seller will have suffered  some prejudice in 
having to take back a used consum er product whose resale value and re­
salability is seriously affected by such use.167 T h e  Act, therefore, attem pts 
to counterbalance potential prejudice to the seller with the following p ro ­
vision:
17(2) T h e  seller m ay deduct from  the ref und o f  any paym ents on the price 
or recover from  the buyer, or both, an am ount that is equitable in the 
circum stances for the benefit, if  any, that the buyer derived from  use of 
the product.
It should be noted that section 17(2) as originally enacted excluded the 
seller’s right to deduct for any benefit derived from  use during  the first 
ten days following delivery. T he  rationale for this exclusion was set out in 
the First Report:
T he o n e  exception  that we v.ould m ake to the seller's tight to recover in 
restitution for the value of the net benefit received by the buyer from  use 
o f  the goods is the case where the buyer exercises his rejection rights within 
a very short period  after receiving the goods. T o  give the seller a right to 
recover in this case, although certainly desirable in theorv. is in our opin ion  
apt to cause severe practical problem s through disputes as to what value 
should be placed on such l>enehts. Since the am ount o f  m oney involved in 
this case should Ix* small, and considerin g  som e of the reasons for granting  
rejection rights in the first place, it does not seem  unreasonable to make 
this exception . O therw ise there is great danger that an unsc rupulous seller 
who has already l>een paid m ight deduct or threaten to deduct from the 
refund an inflated am ount which he claims represents the benefit to the 
buyer. Such a prac tice could in m any cases defeat for all practical purposes 
the consu m er’s right to rejec t . .
"’•’T h e  Alberta Institute of t.aw R esearch ancf R eform , in its Hr port on the I 'n i/orm  Sair »/ ( . ihmU Art. \upra. 
footn ote b5, at p. 168, n o ted  that the draftsm an  of th e V (> A "did not anticipate the tw entieth  centurv  
exp losion  hi the selling of <on su m er and com p lex  tnanufac tured  good s and  the w.t\ in w hi< h this |>etsuaded  
courts to exten d  the p eriod  in win« h a buver cou ld  mspec t good s. 01 i ou ld  allow a sellet to iron out teeth ing  
problem s."
lh7'I he (. W'.L.A. p roh ib its the sale of con sum er produc ts as new w hen  th e \ have !>ecn used s. 9.
"'"See also <*' 17(3), the text of w hich is con ta in ed  \u fna , alx>vc fo o tn o te  124. p rovid ing com p en sation  to  
the seller for d ep rec ia tion , d am age, and unreasonab le wear and  te.ii Cf section 23(c) Saskatchew an \« » 
which pettm ts a seller to set o ff "an am ount that is equ itab le lot the use o l the p iod u ct p rovid ing that in 
determ in in g the am ou nt n o  regard  shall Ik- taken of the d ep re  lation of the product unless it is o th e iw ise  
provided for in th e regu la tion s fo r  a full d iscu ssion  see R om ero. supra, toot note r>(>. at p 331
",MSupra , foo tn o te  13, at p. 13(1
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Removal o f this exclusion by am endm ent in 1980170 should not result in 
substantial prejudice to consum ers du e  in large part to the mechanics o f 
the seller’s deduction as it relates to the buyer’s lien for re tu rn  o f his 
purchase monies. T h e  C onsum er Protection Project’s m ajor concern, as 
noted above, related to the value to be placed on the buyer’s benefits and 
the potential for unscrupulous sellers to defeat the consum er’s rejection 
rights by inflating that value. Special C .P .W .L .A . provisions to help resolve 
such disputes do m uch to allay this concern. W here the seller claims the 
right to deduct from  the consum er’s re fund  an am ount for benefits, dam age 
o r depreciation, he is not entitled to re tu rn  o f  the consum er product unless 
he (1) pays the consum er any am ount that is not in dispute, and (2) deposits 
the am ount in d ispute with a court and gives the consum er a copy o f the 
receipt for the deposit.171 If  the seller doesn’t bring an action to realize his 
claim within fifteen days afte r m aking the deposit, the money will be paid 
out to the consum er.172
T h e C .P .W .L .A . a ttem pt to avoid prejudice to the seller by allowing 
him com pensation for any benefits received by t!ie buyer th rough use of 
the consum er product may still be perceived by many sellers as less than 
satisfactory. In the United States, w here a seller is perm itted to recover 
from  the buyer in restitution for the fair value o f any benefit conferred  as 
a result o f the buver’s use, the norm al m ethod for m easuring that value is 
to calculate the rental value o f like goods for the relevant period o f use.175 
In the vast majority o f  such cases, the benefit value to the buyer will Ik * 
substantially less than the disproportionately  high initial depreciation which 
the consum er product has en d u red , ie. the d ifference between the fair 
m arket value o f a new vs. used consum er product. Any attem pt, however, 
to reflect all o f this depreciation in an assessment o f benefit to the buyer 
is untenable.
I). D AM AGES
W here the seller is in breach o f any C .P .W .L .A . warranty the buyer 
may recover dam ages.174 Similarly, even where he rejects the consum er 
product, the buver may recover dam ages from  the seller in addition to 
recovering any paym ents that he has m ade on the price.175 In either case
,7"S.N.B I9K0. c. 12. s. 4.
1711 his is the com b in ed  e ffec t of ss IH(I) an d  (3).
,72Section 18(5). O th erw ise , w here an actton is co m m en ced , the m onev is paid out at the d irection  of .1 
judge of th e court
,7,flvr<i v \to o rr  Lord (.i>mptin\. 157 S.h 2d  4 1 (Cía A p p  IMb7) O f cou rse, in m anv cases, the benefit received  
bv the buver from  .1 d efective  con sum er product cou ld  lx- substantially less d ep en d in g  u pon  the nature 
of the breach of w arranty.
'’’Section IV It shou ld  also f>e kept 111 m ind  that th e abolition  of pnvitv of contract in section  23 of the  
(. V  W L.A  perm its a m  |>erson w ho is not a partv to the- contract but w ho  suffers a con su m er loss because  
of the breach to  recover d am ages subject to  the sam e reasonable foreseeability  rules see Part I. \upra. 
foo tn o te  I, at pp. 138-139.
l7'Section  17(1)
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the dam ages recoverable are those which were “reasonably foreseeable at 
the time o f the contract as liable to result from  the breach o f w arranty.” 
T h e  identical expression is used in all references to the rem edy o f dam ages 
in the Saskatchewan A ct.176 T his w ording merely restates the com m on law 
rem oteness o f dam ages rule originally enunciated in Hadley v. Baxendale177 
and reproduced  in the Sale o f Goods Act. Section 50(2), reflecting the first 
branch o f Baron A lderson’s ru le in Hadley v. Baxendale, provides that the 
seller’s prima facie  liability is the “estim ated loss directly and naturally re­
sulting, in the ord inary  course o f events, from  the breach o f  w arranty."178 
T h e  second branch o f the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale deals with losses arising 
from  unusual circum stances o f which the parties were aware and the buyer’s 
right to claim such “special dam ages” is reserved, albeit obscurely, by section 
51 o f the S.G .A. T h e  tendency o f m odern cases is to view the two branches 
o f the Hadley v. Baxendale rule as exhibiting a unitary test o f reasonable 
foreseeability,179 and the C .P .W .L .A . and Saskatchewan form ulations merely 
provide legislative recognition o f this proclivity.180
In conclusion it should also be noted that the C .P .W .L .A . definition o f 
“loss” is consonant with the cases which have analysed and applied the 
above test.181 It establishes that, within the ambit o f reasonable foreseea­
bility, a seller in breach o f w arranty may be liable for “loss o r dam age o f 
any kind, including economic loss, dam age to property and personal in­
,,6Sections 2 0 (l)(n ), 24 . 26(3), and 27. Sask Act
l77(1854 ), 9  F.xch 231 . th a t corn erston e of consequentia l dam ages proclaim ed  that the aggrieved  pariv 
cou ld  recover dam ages:
. . such as may fairly and reasonably be con sid ered  either arising natut i l ls . le .« co r d in g  to  th e usual 
cou rse of th in gs, from  su th  breath  o f contract itself, or su ih  as mav reasonably Ik- su p p osed  to have 
been in th e con tem p lation  of both parties, at the tim e thev m ade th e  contract, as the probable result 
of the breach of it.
T h e  rule in Hadley v. Htixeruiale was recently authoritatively restated  m Koufas v ( .la m ik o w  <lhe Ile u m  I I i, 
[ 1969] 1 A.C. 350  (H .L .), and / /  Parsons (Livestock> L td  v. I ttle\ Inghtim <S (.<> . 119 7 M) I All I- K 525  (I n g , 
C .A .). For an exh au stive analysis of the H a d ln  v. Baxendale foreseeability rule and subsequent refin em en ts. 
see O nlano Sale of (ioods Report. supra, fo o tn o te  13. at pp. 4 9 1 -494 . See also Sw inton. "Foreseeability W here  
Should  the Award of (Uintract D am ages C ease'"  Studv 3 in Reiter and  Swan (eds ). Stwhes m  ( .o n tn u t I mu 
(1980), 61; ( .an lm  l.td  v. Ttuokol Fibres Canada Ltd.. (1983), 40  ( )  K (2d) 087  (O nt.( A )
l7*The sam e test ap pears m s 48(2) S.G .A . as the m easure of d am ages in the event of non-delivery
l7,M he trend  em erged  with the judgm ent of Asquith I. | in \ i i to n a  l.aundrs, (W indsoi) l td v Sea man 
Industries Ltd. [ 1949) 2 K B  528 . at p. 539  (F.ng C A .), whic h com b in ed  the two brant lies in to o n e  entitling  
and aggrieved  buyer “to  recover such part of the loss actually resu lting as was at the tune of th e contract 
reasonably foreseeab le as liable to result from  the breat h " M ore recently in Koufa\ v ( la rn ik tn r  1 1 he Ileu m  
II). supra, foo tn o te  177, at p 385, lo r d  Reid said that he d id trot "think that it was in ten d ed  that there  
w ere to be tw o rules or that tw o d ifferen t standards or tests w ere to  Ik- applied Ind eed , it is not alwavs 
easy to d istingu ish  b etw een  the two branches of Baron A lderson's rule and o n e  writer com m en ts that "the 
m od ern  restatem ent o f th e rule as a totality is a salutary trend" see M rtiregoi mi Damages. ( I Ith ed  , 1980) 
at p 195
"“'M ore recent form u lations have p rovided  likewise see s 9  16(2) of the O ntario D ia ft Sales Hill and s 
9 .18 (2 ) of the L'niform Sale of Goods Art whic h con tin u e to hold the seller liable Im all substantially foreseeaM e  
d am ages falling within the H adlr\ v Haxendale form ula and refined  bv Kuu/as v. ( zarriikou i I he Ileu m  III. 
supra, foo tn o te  177, i n .  that the loss is not too  rem ote if it was "liable to result" or "not unlikely to result" 
see O ntario Sale of Goods Report, supra, foo tn o te  13. at p. 493.
'"'See R om ero, supra, fo o tn o te  56, at p .332
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ju ry .”182 This definition clearly establishes that, notw ithstanding the b road ­
ened param eters o f  the seller’s potential liability effected by the C .P .W .L .A ., 
that liability extends fully into the area o f  consequential dam ages. T he  
rationale favouring full protection o f the buyer’s expectation interest, as 
set out in the First R eport, clearly reflects a policy choice based on the 
economic g rounds o f avoiding misallocation o f resources:
. .  . [A] very inespensive but defective product may be responsible for very 
serious dam age to person, property or pocketbook. T his kind o f  risk is 
m uch m ore difficult to evaluate than is the risk involved in having simply 
to replace a defective product, but if  it is difficult for the businessm an to  
evaluate, it is even m ore difficult for the consum er to evaluate. Again, we 
fail to see why the burden o f  this loss, which is caused by the defective  
product, should be borne by the individual consum er. It is really a cost o f  
the production, sale and use o f  goods o f  that tvpe and should be reflected  
in the price o f  the product. If the true costs are not reflected in the price 
then, as econom ists would say. there is a misallocation o f  resources. I f the  
true costs are reflected in the prices, and it is found that consum ers are 
unwilling to pav these prices and that the product cannot be sold, all we 
can say is that we are not convinced that consum ers and society will be the  
worse for it. It is also som etim es said that such liabilities would inhibit the  
developm ent o f  new products and innovative ideas. In econom ic term s, 
however, we fail to see why these new products should not bear their costs 
rather than having them  borne by the individual consum er . . . |K1
III PERMISSIBLE EXCLUSION OR RESTRICTION 
1. IN T R O D U C T IO N
T he C .P .W .L .A . trea tm ent o f the disclaimer issue illustrates again the 
Act’s fidem habeat emptor orientation assuaged somewhat by the Emptores 
venditores que ultra modum lie disidant principle. T he  implied w arranties are 
statutory guarantees of quality, fitness and durability and, as such, are based 
on the reasonable expectations of the parties. No exclusion o r restriction 
o f the w arranties o r rem edies for breac h is perm itted. On the o ther hand, 
while the seller cannot exclude o r restrict C.P .W .L .A . express w arranties, 
he can exclude o r restrict the C.P .W .L .A . rem edies for their breach. In 
o rder to prevent prejudice to the consum er, he is only perm itted to do so 
to the extent that it is fair and  reasonable. This should have the effect of 
preventing such things as hidden disclaimer clauses, clauses whereby the 
seller sets him self up as the sole judge o f whether a consum er product is 
defective, etc. T h e  consum er can have confidence that the seller cannot 
avoid this aspect o f  the C .P .W .L .A . by m anipulating the form  in which he 
makes his promise.
W here an exclusion >r restriction of remedy is effective between the 
seller and co n su ii.'r , the e r will not Ik* prejudiced by inability to assert
lh:iSec non  1(1). N ote that the Sask -it. hew an Act. unlike the i. / ’ U I .4 . goes  further in p erm ittin g  con su m ers  
to recover exem plary' d im a g e s  lor a "wilful and know ing violation of the Act: see s. 28  Sa>k Act.
""Supra . foo tn o te  lit, at pp. 148-149. Of cou rse the full protection o l the huver's exp ectation  in terest is 
suh|ect to ioresecahilitv  rules and the d utv  to m itigate.
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that effectiveness against a th ird  party who suffers a “consum er loss”. At 
the same time, if the seller’s exclusion o r restriction is found to be ineffective 
between the seller and consum er, the seller should not be prejudiced by 
being unable to rely on the ineffectiveness o f a similar agreem ent vis-a-vis 
his own suppliers, given the C .P .W .L .A . philosophy o f tracing back liability 
for the breach o f w arranty. T hus, evidentiary presum ptions are provided 
to assist the seller for this purpose. Also in this respect, the disclaimer 
provisions generally recognize that a seller should not be prejudiced by the 
successful and permissible exclusion o f C .P .W .L .A . warranties and remedies 
in a contract with his supplier where the seller later incurs liability for a 
consum er loss.
2. IMPLIED WARRANTIES AND C.P.W.LA. REMEDIES
Section 52 o f the Sale o f Goods Act recognizes the principle o f freedom  
of contract and perm its a seller to exclude o r modify the implied conditions 
and warranties that the Act would otherwise impose. T he Ontario Warranties 
Report noted the predilicton o f  retail sellers to take advantage o f this option 
and enum erated  the d ifferen t types o f disclaimer clauses predom inating 
written consum er contracts:
(1) Clauses exclud ing all representations, warranties and conditions, e x ­
press or im plied, statutory or otherwise, and substituting in their place 
the supplier’s own warranties o f  quality and perform ance.
(2) T he sam e types of clauses as in (1) but without substitutional warranties.
(3) Clauses which do not exclud e the im plied warranties and conditions but 
which limit the m easure o f  dam ages recoverable from  the seller.
(4) Clauses which exclude all claims for consequential dam ages.
(5) Clauses which describe the goods as being sold on an “as is” basis or 
“with all faults”.
(6) Clauses which require all com plaints involving the goods to 1h- lodged  
within a restricted period.
(7) Clauses in which the buver acknow ledges that he received the goods in 
good condition and that they conform  to the term s of the contract."14
In general the consum er who signs a printed form contract containing one 
or m ore o f these disclaimer clauses will be bound thereby notwithstanding 
that he neither read nor was expected to read the contract.IH’ As stated in 
New Brunswick’s First R eport, the result in many cases is that “the buyer 
loses rights that the law m eant him to have and has his reasonable expec­
tations defeated (the implied term s, after all. are based upon reasonable 
expectations) by reason o f a clause in a contrac t which he is not even aware 
of, or if he is, which he is not able to change.” lm' M odern judicial antipathy
"“Supra, footn ote 13, at p 47
lltsA recent « r u le r  lest lor the in corporation  o l disc launer clauses in to cou iiatl.s niav Ik- em ei^ n ix  see 
Txlden Rent-A-Car Co v (.U ridm nm g  ( 197N), K3 I) I K (3d) 4<HI (Ont ( \  I
""’.Su/mj, footn ote 13. at p. 145
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towards such disclaimer clauses and the consequent judicial ingenuity em ­
ployed in striking them  down using the constructional approach and the 
doctrine o f breach o f fundam ental obligations have been docum ented else­
w here.187 Also prom inent in this regard , and likewise docum ented else­
w here,188 are various statutory provisions preventing attem pts to contract 
out o f the S.G.A. implied term s in consum er sales.189
T h e First Report o f the New Brunswick Consumer Protection Project ex­
am ined positions favoured by o ther law reform  agencies and adopted in 
the consum er protection legislation o f o ther jurisdictions. It noted that 
differences, where extant, were largely based on w hether a ban should be 
total or w hether some exceptions should be permissible and, following the 
approach in a majority o f these precedents, it negatived possible exceptions 
based upon the type o f implied te rm ,190 tvpe o f goods,191 and type o f 
liability.192 T h e  m ajor policy reasons put forth in support o f  disallowing 
any limitation o f liability included the fact that the implied term s are based 
on the reasonable expectations o f the consum er, the reality o f a lack o f 
consum er bargaining power, the seller’s preem inent opportunity  to detect 
patently defective consum er products and the seller’s superior position to 
appreciate the risk o f latent defects and to make arrangem ents for con­
sequent pro tection .m  T he recom m endation of an absolute prohibition 
against contracting out o f o r otherw ise restricting the implied C .P .W .L .A . 
warranties and  remedies for their breach was im plem ented without m od­
ification in section 24 o f the C .P .W .L .A .. This prohibition should not, how­
ever, be viewed in isolation from the flexibility of the C .P .W .L .A . quality 
and fitness warranties. It will not have the effect of preventing a seller 
f rom selling a defective consum er product to a consum er without incurring
|M7See (Jntarui Warranties Report, supra. toolnnlt' 13, al pp. 50-53.
'**lbtd . at pp. 53-61
'"‘See Sale of hoods Act, K S B C . 1979. c 370, s. 20; I he (Consumer TrotetUon Act. R.S.M 1970. c (.200, s. 
58(1), Consumer I'rotectum Act. S \.N  1975. i 19. s I. adding  s 2<K . The Consumer 1‘iotection Act. R S O  
19H0. c. N7. s 34(2); Saskatchewan Act, s. 7 as am See also Sapply of Goods i Implied Terms) Act. 1^71  (I k  (. 
s. 4. I n p u t Contract Terms Act, / (I K ), s. t>. Consumer Transit!turns A it. 1972  S.S A 1972. No. 135. ss 
8. 10
IM"'I lie h i s t  Report recom m en d ed  that New Hi unswic k s con siim ei protection  legislation follow the u im ersa l 
approach of reform  jurisdictions banning the contracting out ot m erchantability in con sum e! transactions 
and the near-universal approach  o l unclosing an absolute ban o il the co n iia c lin g  out ot the im plied  term  
as to title ((./ I  K Supply oj Goods tIm plied Terms) A il. 1 ^71 , ss I. 4) and  fitness: supra, foo tn o te  13. ai pp  
171 173.
w,T h e  recom m en dation  was largely predicated on  the tact that the- new im plied w arranties pul forth  in 
the l ir s t  Report w ere sufficiently flexible to accom m odate the d iffer en ce  ill d ie obligations im posed  on  I he 
seller of new ss used  consum er products ihtd.. at p p  173-174 (./ the special treatm ent accorded seco n d ­
hand d ea lers und er s 6(2) Sask Act
'■'•Notwithstanding the b road en ed  param eters of the seller's ftotenlial liabilitv for breach o l the im plied  
w airarities w h u h  it recom m en d ed , th e f i r s t  R efxn t favou red  the im position  of sirn i rather than fault-based  
liability supra, foo tn o te  13. at pp. 141-149. 176, and ad v i m  ated lu ll protec lion  ot th e consum er s expec tat ion  
interest hv d en vu ig  exclusion  claim s tor consequentia l losses ovei and ab ose th e purchase price o l the 
consum er p io d u c i see text accom panying foo tn o te  IH3
f ir s t Report, supra, foo tn o te  13. at pp 141)147
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liability for the defect. Rather, what it will prevent, and is in tended to 
p reven t,194 is the seller placing the risk o f any and all defects upon the 
consum er.
3. EXPRESS WARRANTIES AND C.P.W.LA. REMEDIES
A. G EN ER AL
T he First Report, following the precedent o f the Ontario Warranties 
Report,''* had no difficulty recom m ending prohibition on contracting out 
o f  the express w arranties19* and section 24 o f the C .P .W .L A . adopts this 
recommendation.Jft^gain, however, the im portance o f viewing the p roh i­
bition within the fo fcex t o f the Act ra ther than in isolation must be em ­
phasized.197 While a seller is indeed prohibited un d er section 24 from  
excluding o r restricting an express w arranty extant at the time o f contract, 
he can still prevent it from  arising in the first place either by not making 
the representation which later m atures into a C .P .W .L .A . express warranty 
or. if made, by clearly retracting it prior to the time of contractual form ation 
so that the buyer’s non-reliance o r unreasonable reliance can be estab­
lished.19"
T h e C onsum er Protection Project had difficulty with its recom m en­
dation concerning w hether the New Brunswick legislation should allow the 
seller to place any limitation on the rem edies for breach of an express 
warranty. It ultimately concluded, following the recom m endations of the 
Ontario Warranties Report.'"'' that the prohibition should be absolute on the 
basis that the reasons supporting  m inim um  standards in the implied term s 
area also applied to support m inim um  standards in the express term s area*"" 
and that an absolute prohibition would simplif y understanding, com parison 
and control for both consum ers and the courts.-’"1 While an absolute p ro ­
hibition approach was adopted  in the Saskatchewan Act,-"* the C .P .W .L A .
''»Ibid  . at p I II
i'4''Supra, fo o tn o te  IS. at p  (>2
'* h > \t liefHirt, \uptn . fo o tn o te  IS at p p  177-178
14 Ibid.. at p . 178
l<*KSe«tlon 1(1) < / ’ II /  S hot a full d is iu ssion  see Part I. \u fna . foo tn o te  at pp  14 8 -1.Vi 
''"Su fnu . foo tn o te  19')
A>>,h r \ t  liefwrt. sufrra. footnote IS, at pp  179-184 
i" '!bui . at pp  lH r> IHM
-’"-See s 7( I ) Sask At t w hit h  w as te f tca led  a n d  t ep la i e d  l>\ S S 1979-80 .»  17. s 1. ef te i t i \ e  on  p in t la m atio n
I nt il p t (h lam at ion s 7( 1) i u r ie n lK  le a d s
S ubject to  su b sec tio n  (2) of set (ion t>, e v e r \  a g re e m e n t o t lia ig a m . v erbal <>i u i i t te n .  e x p re s s  oi 
im p lie d , th a t th e  p r o s isioiis of this At t o i th e  iem ula tions shall no t a p p lv . o i h Iiu Ii iii a m  v*a\ lim its, 
m od ifies o t a b ro g a te s  o i in effec t lim its, m o d ifies  o i a b io g a te s a m  sin ti lig h t oi rem ed x . is nu ll a n d  
void.
N o te , hovsevei. tin- e x c e p tio n  in s t><2) as r c g a id s  sales b \ se< o lid -h an d  d e a le rs  see M m U m i \ h n\ (1982). 
I S i  1) 1 K ( Sd)StM  i Sask C A l
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form ulation departed  from  the recom m endation put forth  in the First 
Report. Section 25 o f the Act provides as follows:
25(1) Subject to  subsection (4), where there is a contract for the sale or 
supply o f  a consum er product, the parties may agree to exclude or restrict 
any rem edy provided by this Act for breach o f  an express warranty, but 
such agreem ent shall be ineffective to  the extent that it is shown that it 
would not be fair or reasonable to allow reliance on such agreem ent.
25(2) W here the person alleging that an agreem ent referred to in subsection
(1) is ineffective was him self unable to rely on a similar agreem ent m ade  
between him and another person in relation to the product because it was 
not fair or reasonable for him to relv on that agreem ent, then unless reliance  
on the agreem ent referred to in subsection (1) is shown to Ik* fair and  
reasonable in the circum stances, that agreem ent is ineffective to the sam e 
extent that the similar agreem ent was ineffective.
25(3) In  determ in ing w hether it would Ik * fair or reasonable to allow reliance 
on an agreem ent to exclude or restrict any rem edy provided by this Act 
for breach o f  an express warranty, regard shall be had to all the circum ­
stances o f  the case.
25(4) W here there is a contract for the sale or supply of a consum er product 
by description, the parties cannot agree to exclude or restrict am  rem edv  
provided by this Act for breach of an express warranty that form s part of 
the description of the product.
25(5) For the purposes o f  subsection (4). a sale* or supplv o f  a consum er  
product shall not Ik* prevented from  Ix-ing a sale or supply by description  
In reason only that the product is a specific product that is seen, exam ined , 
tested or selected by the buyer.
25(6) T h e  right of any person claim ing under section 23 is lim ited to the  
extent of any exclusion or restriction o l remedy that the parlies agreed to 
in the contract and that is effective under this section.
If ease in the application o f a rule is a correlative o f  simplicity in its state­
ment, the Saskatchewan approac h is indeed preferable. But, as will be seen, 
the initial C.P .W .L .A . obfuscation may be fully w arranted as a legislative 
attem pt to provide some scope for exclusion or restriction by the seller 
while im posing certain c hecks and balances in response to m ajor concerns 
voiced in the First Report.
B. RE SOLI 'T /O N  OF PA R TIC U L A R  PRO BLE M S  
(0  O verlap Between Express Description and Implied Warranties
II the seller is not perm itted to limit the rem edies for breach ot an 
implied warranty but is perm itted to limit the rem edies for breach o f an 
express warranty, anom alous results could ensue.*"' T h e  problem  mav be 
illustrated as follows. In one part of the contract the seller undertakes to 
supply the buyer with a consum er product of a particular description, eg. 
carrot seeds; in ano ther part o f the contract the seller seeks to limit the 
consum er’s rem edy to a re tu rn  of purchase p rc e  in the event the seed 
supplied is not carrot seed. II description was exclusively an express war­
h i s t  Rrpurl. \ufrra. tool Hole IS, at p 181
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ranty, the seller could presum ably limit the rem edy pursuant to s.25(l). 
T he  difficulty arises insofar as the description also triggers reasonable ex­
pectations un d er the implied w arranty o f requisite quality,204 the remedies 
for breach o f which the seller is not free to exclude o r restrict. Subsection 
25(4) eliminates potential conflict by prohibiting any exclusion o r restriction 
o f C.P .W .L .A . rem edies for breach o f an express w arranty that forms part 
o f the description o f the consum er product. Any residual categorization 
problem s inherent in the sale o f “specific" consum er products has been 
elim inated by subsection 25(5).205
(ii) Insuring Fairness and Reasonableness
O ne o f the quintessential issues in consum er protection legislation is 
how to reconcile the prim ordial principle o f freedom  o f contract with the 
need to impose limits on that freedom  in o ld e r to achieve balance anil 
basic fairness. Anglo-Canadian courts have traditionally refused to tackle 
the problem  of over-reaching head on by simply denying enforcem ent o f 
a contract or clause on the simple ground that it was too harsh to coun­
tenance. While a doctrine o f unconscionability has m ore recently em erged 
in the caselaw,20* judicial m echanisms may be unsuitable for disposing of 
any but the simplest examples of contractual unconscionability.207 American 
courts, on the o ther hand, have been provided with clear statutory authority 
to m onitor sale contracts for basic fairness.2'"4
I he First Report devoted considerable attention to this problem  and, 
following the Ontario Warranties Report p recedent,2oy recom m ended that the 
New Brunswick consum er protection legislation contain a general uncons­
cionability provision to com bat the inequality of bargaining power in con­
sum er sales.210 T his prescient211 recom m endation o f a general f airness and
•’"M)e<t ription  is in the d eterm in ation  ot requisite quality because the "reasonable" q ualm  w ar­
ranted u n d er s 10<l)la) is de(>endeni u p on , inlet alut. the seller's d escription  ot the con su m ei product
;,,,'W hile sales of s|>et lfit good s can fx- sales b \ d escription  p tov id m g the- seller undertakes res|x»iisibilii\ 
u nder the contract for the identity ot the subject m atter, the issue is not entirely Iree from  doubt in New  
Brunswick: see First Report, supra, footn ote I V .it pp. 74-7t> foi a full disc ussion ot txxlsur \ Beatty ( \ . l l (  . A I 
and its anom alou s im plications
-’" ' See. lo t exam ple. I.loyd's Hank s Hands, 1I975| B 32b (fcng. ( A ), vs tiu ti has !>een applied  in ( anada 
in the sale of goods context Harrs \ Kreutzigei (1978), 95 1)1 K (3d) 231 (B.C.C.A.). l-oi .1 general 
disc ussion ot the dot trine  ot unionstionahilitv  see W addam s. "I n tonstionah ilin  in C onirat is . ( 197b) VI 
M od I R  3b9 See also O ntario Sale of Cootls Report, supra, footnote 1.3. .11 pp I 53 -1 5b
-'" See lia sso n , “t n tonst lonabilitv 111 ( .o n tr .n l l,aw anti in th e  New Sales A ct—C on fession s ot a D oubling  
I hom as," (1979 -80 ) 4 (.an  Hus I j  383 S ee also: Keiter. "I lit oust lonabililv Is th e r e  a C h o k er  A Replv 
to Professor tlasson,"  ( 1980) 4 Can Hus I. / 403; l.e ft. " I honnst I n tonstionabihtv ,"  < 1980) I ( an Hus
I I  424
-■""Sr e  I C C  2-302  
JWSupru. foo tn o te  195.
2I".Supia. too tn o te  13. at pp 1 ">9-1 ♦>.*>
1/1'See the u n co tm  lonabrim  provisions con ta in ed  in sections 5 2 ot the O ntario D raft Sales Hill and the 
I inform Sale of (,oods Art. I fie m a |o i tlif teren t e betw een the ( )ntai 10 anti t ’n itorm  torm ulations com  etn s  
vs h ethei a court should  he ab le to  raise the issue o l tint oust lonabilitv on  its ow n m otion; the tot m et answ ers  
the question  a fh im ative lv . th e lattei negatively
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reasonableness control was not adopted per se in the C .P .W .L .A . T he  leg­
islation does, however, in subsection 25(2), subject the seller’s pu rpo rted  
exclusion o r restriction o f  C .P .W .L .A . rem edies for breach o f an express 
w arranty to this test. And subsection 25(3) provides that in determ ining 
this question regard  shall be had to all the circum stances o f the case. Some 
legislative guidelines for a general fairness and reasonableness control were 
provided in the First Report. It is subm itted, these would be, mutatis mutandis, 
appropriate  but not exhaustive considerations notw ithstanding the limited 
application o f that control in the C .P .W .L .A ., ie. to determ ine the effec­
tiveness o f a seller’s exclusion o r restriction o f the C .P .W .L .A . rem edies for 
breach o f an express w arranty:
(a) whether the consum er knew or ought to have known o f  the term in 
question , and understood or ought to have understood its effect;
(b) w hether the consum er freely consented  to the term  in question;
(c) w hether the consum er had an opportunity to obtain different terms 
from  that in question from  the seller or from som eone else, and knew  
and was able to take advantage o f  this opportunity;
(d) if the term places a risk on the consum er, which party was in practice 
in the better position to m itigate the effect o f  the risk dealt with bv the 
term , for exam ple, by insuring against that risk;
(e) whether the seller took undue advantage o f  the consu m er’s position or 
the consu m er’s lack o f  know ledge, ability or experience;
(f) whether the term  or the contract appears to be excessively one-sided in 
favour o f  the seller.*12
T hus, for exam ple, in the absence o f very special circumstances, fairness 
and reasonableness would require any limitation to In* clearly disclosed to 
the consum er before the contract is made,*1 * and would prevent the seller 
f rom setting himself up as the sole ju d g e  of w hether a consum er product 
is defective.214 T h e  fairness an ! reasonableness test would take into con­
sideration such things as w hether the consum er product was m anufactured , 
processed o r adapted  to the special o rd e r o f the consum er.215 Likewise it 
would exam ine the degree to which the seller has taken advantage o f the 
inability o f the consum er to protect his interests because o f physical or
^'-See First Report, sufrra. fo o tn o te  IS. at pp. 167- 16H. I he sources provid ing p reced en ts for these gu id elines  
are en iim e ia ted  in foo tn o te  S3, at p 167 C f the n o il-exh au stive  en u m eration s con tain ed  in ss ">.2(2) of 
the O ntario D raft Sales Hill and the I inform  Sale of (¡nod* Art. See also s. 55 (3 ) of the Sale of (.oods Art. 1979  
(U .K .) w hich allow s the cou rts to strike d ow n  a m  clause hi a com m ercial contra« t which the court finds to  
be "unreasonable": (.eorge M itt hell ((Chester hall I l.ld  v. Finney Lock Seeds L td .  |I9M 2| 3 W.L.K. 1036 (Eng.
c: .A).
<MSee s. 6(2 ) of the Sask. Ac t v\hic h perm its the exc lusion or m oditu ation of statutory v\at ratines hs seco n d ­
hand d ealers but onlv if it is "brought to the notice of th e con sum er and  its effect m ade clear to him  
See also: (Consumer transactions Act. 1972. S .S.A . 1972. N o. 135, s. 10(3).
*l4S ee First Report, supra, foo tn o te  IS, at p. IHO ( f  Sask Act. s. 17(3)(a). which prohibits am  clause  
purportin g  to m ake a w arrantor the sole |iid g e  of a w arrants claim.
21 H .f Subsection  (e) of S ch ed u le  2 "G uidelines" for A pplication  of R easonableness le s t  u nd et the I 'rifan  
(Contract Terms Act. 1977  ( I  K ).
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mental infirmity, illiteracy, inability to understand  the language of an agree­
m ent,216 lack o f education, financial distress o r similar factors.217
(Hi) Evidentiary Burdens
Who should bear the evidentiary bu rd en  o f  establishing the fairness 
and reasonableness o f an attem pted exclusion o r restriction of the C.P.W .L.A. 
remedies for breach o f an express warranty? T h e  First Report recom m ended 
that the onus should be on the seller to justify the fairness and reasona­
bleness o f the lim itation.2,8 T his recom m endation was not enacted in the 
C .P .W .L .A . insofar as section 25(1) gives effect to the attem pted exclusion 
or restriction unless.“it is shown [by the consum er] that it would not be 
fair o r reasonable to allow reliance on such agreem ent.” T his is unfortunate , 
given the failure o f the C .P .W .L .A . to prevent the seller from  m isrepre­
senting to the consum er what his rights are by the continued use of unfair 
or unreasonable disclaim er clauses,21" and  the failure o f  the C .P .W .L .A . in 
any circumstance to require the seller to inform  the consumer of his rights.22" 
In the above context it is im portan t to note that w here the seller is himself 
unable to rely on a disclaim er clause because it is established to be unfair 
or unreasonable by the consum er, he carries, pursuan t to subsection 25(2), 
a d ifferen t evidentiary b u rd en  in a contem poraneous o r subsequent action 
against his supplier w here the contract contains a similar provision. This 
is essential to the “tracing” policy adopted  by the C.P.W .L.A .'221 T hus, for 
example, once a clause is shown to be un fa ir o r unreasonable as between 
retailer and consum er, it is presum ed via this subsection to be unfair or 
unreasonable as between retailer and wholesaler unless it is shown by the 
wholesaler to be fair and  reasonable. T h e  net effect then, in the circum ­
stances, is to shift the evidentiary burden  in o rd e r to prom ote this “tracing” 
policy.
Finally, subsection 25(6) addresses the issue of disclaimer clauses in 
non-privity cases, ie. to what extent should a seller be able to avail himself
2lhC./ First Report. supra. foo tn o te  13. at p. 210 , w herein  the C on su m er Protection Project recoin m en d ed  
ih.it written con su m er contracts sh ou ld  Ik* required to Ik- ex p ressed  in the sam e official lan gu age as th.it 
prmcipallv used in the oral n egotiations.
*|TSee s. 5 .2(2)(a) of the- O ntario D raft Sales Hill and s 5.2(2)<g) of the I'ruform  Sale of (,»ods Act.
l[HFirst Report, supra, fcxitnote 13, at p. 100 In so recom m en d in g , th e C onsum er Protection Project follow ed  
the precedent of the Misrepresentation  .4»/. /V 67 (I k  >. s 3
^ ''The First Report recom m en d ed , as d id  the Ontario W arranties Report (\upra. foo tn o te  195). that the use 
of such clauses should  lie p roh ib ited  supra, footn ote 13. .it p. 20 5  I he Sask Act. win« h basic alls prohibits 
exclusion  or m odification  of a m  statutorv warranties o i rem ed ies, also p toh ih its  and creates a statutorv 
o ffen ce  lot th e  use of purported  d iscla im ers sec- s 7(2) as am  b \ S S 1979-MO. c 17. s I and s I7(3)(b).
""W hile the F ust Refxirt d id not recom m en d  the im p osition  o f such an ob ligation  In wav of a general 
requirem ent, it saw no reason w h v . in th e c ase of w ritten contrac ts. the doc unicnt should  not state that us 
term s are in addition to anv rights o r  rem ed ies the consum er m as h a v eu n d er  the* i . /' W I supra, footn ote  
13, at p. 20b.
rjl t o  further the sam e purpose sec n o n  2b of the Ac t eflc-c nvelv enables a le ta ile i w ho me urs lialnlitv to a 
consum er for breach of a ( / ' I t  I. A im plied  warrants to  trace back and  recover m dem m tv from  fits 
supplier, w ho in turn can trace back and recover m dem m tv from  Ins sup p lier etc notw ithstan d in g p m -  
ported . and oth erw ise |>eimissihlc-. exc lu sion s or restrictions m the sales d en um entation
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o f an effective exclusion o r restriction o f  rem edies against a th ird  party 
who suffers a “consum er loss”? While the answer provided is clear enough, 
viz. that the seller is able to assert against the th ird  party any effective 
exclusion o r restriction, its application deserves fu rth e r com m ent in regard 
to express representations o r prom ises m ade directly by a prio r seller to 
the consum er himself. This may best be illustrated by the case o f a television 
commercial o r new spaper advertisem ent sponsored by the m anufacturer 
and containing express w arranties with no rem edial qualifications,222 fol­
lowed by the consum er’s purchase o f the product from  his retailer under 
a written contract restricting the C .P .W .L .A . rem edies fo r breach o f express 
warranty. W hether o r not the retailer has adopted  o r is deem ed22* to have 
adopted  the m an u fac tu rer’s statem ents, he is free to exclude o r restrict the
C .P .W .L .A . rem edies for breach o f express w arranties un d er section 25(1) 
subject to the fairness and  reasonableness control. Assuming that exclusion 
or restriction is effective vis-à-vis the consum er and his retailer, the con­
sum er may still be able to succeed against the m anufactu rer un d er section 
23 o f the C .P .W .L .A . T h e  consum er, in circum stances where the adver­
tisements were run  p rio r to the contract between m anufactu rer and retailer 
(given a direct distribution chain), can sue notw ithstanding lack o f privitv, 
for breach o f the m anufac tu rer’s w arranty in the contract between the 
m anufacturer and retailer. In that contract for the sale or supply o f con­
sum er products, the m anufac tu rer’s advertisem ents constitute express war­
ranties from  the m anufactu rer to the retailer w hether o r not the retailer 
him self relied on the advertisem ents, unless it would have been unreason­
able for him to so rely.224 O f course, the m anufactu rer and retailer could 
agree to exclude o r restrict any C .P .W .L .A . w arranty o r rem edy in their 
contract pursuan t to section 26 o f the Act. In the circum stances presented, 
the only exclusions o r restrictions which would be effective in the consum ­
e r’s action against the m anufactu rer would be in relation to the section 13 
rem edies for breach o f express w arranty and these would also be subject 
to the fairness and reasonableness control imposed by subsection 25(1).
(iv) Curbing M anipulation of Promissory Form
Express w arranties pose a difficulty that implied w arranties do  not, 
because rem edies depend  upon the form  in which prom ises are m ade and 
because prom ises may be m ade in d ifferen t forms. The First Report of fered 
the following illustration to em phasize the potential im portance of form  
ill determ ining the success or failure o f a seller, even in the face of an 
absolute prohibition, who pu rports  to limit the buyer’s rem edial recourse 
for breach of an express warranty:
For exam ple, a seller w ho guaranteed that the goods were m perfect con ­
dition but went on to purport to limit his liability to hftv per cent of the  
cost of repairing any defects would Ik- unsuccessful in his purported lim i­
*’?aS ee s. 4 (l)(c ) . For a full d iy  u ssion  see  Part I. \u fna , fo o tn o te  I, at pp. 102-136.
'"’S ee s. 4(2). 
rl*Supia. fo o tn o te  222.
I
tation, and w ould be liable for the full cost o f  repairs and other consequential 
dam ages caused by the goods being defective. But a seller could achieve  
the lim itation he desired by recasting the form  in which he m akes his guar­
antee so that, instead o f  m aking a prom ise that the goods are in perfect 
condition, he prom ises that if  they are not in perfect condition  then he will 
pav fifty per cent o f  the cost o f  repairing any defects. By m aking his prom ise  
in this form , the seller would not run afoul o f  the rule prohibiting the  
limitation o f  rem edies and yet would be successful in lim iting his liability 
to fifty per cent o f  the repair cost and consequential dam ages arising only  
from  breach o f  the obligation to pav fifty per cent o f  the repair costs. T h e  
result would be that the “sm art” seller who used the right form ula could  
effectively limit his liability, while the unsuspecting seller w ho used the 
w rong form ula would fail in his attem pt at lim itation, even though in sub­
stance both o f  them  w ere out to accom plish the very sam e thing, limited 
liability. It w ould be w rong to say “I prom ise X but I limit my liability to 
Y”, but it would be all right to say “If X does not occur then I will do  Y”.” 5
In o rd e r to avoid such haphazard  results and in an effort to achieve uniform  
standards, the C.P.W '.L.A ., following a recom m endation o f  the C onsum er 
Protection Project,226 contains an appropria te  deem ing provision which 
provides that any prom ise that the seller makes if the consum er product 
fails to meet the specifications set forth  in a prom ise is a prom ise that the 
consum er product will meet the specifications set forth:
H Any express warranty given by the seller to the buyer to repair, replace, 
make a refund  or do  anything else if  the product is defective, breaks dow n, 
m alfunctions or fails to  m eet his specifications shall be1 deem ed  to include  
an express warranty that the product is not defective or will not break down, 
m alfunction or fail to m eet his specifications, as the case m a\ be during the 
term o f  the express warranty.'"7
This provision should effectively prevent the seller f rom excluding or re ­
stricting the rem edies for breach of a C.P .W .L .A . express w arranty through 
the sole m eans o f  m anipulating the form  in which the prom ise is made.
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